John Duns Scotus

The possibility of the incarnation

Lectura III distinction 1 question 1
Latin text and English translation

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Is it possible to personally unite human nature with the divine Word?

Regarding the first distinction of the third book it is asked first whether it is possible to personally unite human nature with the divine Word.

It seems not to be so:

First: pure and infinite act cannot be composed with something else, just as it is not composed in itself because of its infinity and actuality. Now the divine Word is a pure and infinite act. Therefore, it cannot be composed with something else. Human nature, however, can be united with the Word only by means of composition. Therefore, human nature cannot be united with the Word.

Confirmation: a union of one thing with another is only possible if there is an addition of that thing to the other, because an addition of one thing to another is only possible if there is something which was not there before. Nothing, however, can be added to the infinite.

The second argument goes like this: what can be united, can have proportion. However, the finite is in no proportion to the infinite. Therefore they cannot be united. For this reason human nature cannot be united with the Word.

The third argument goes like this: contraries cannot be united in regard to the same thing, as is clear from the fourth book of the *Metaphysics*. Now their distance or diversity is greater if there is not a single common entity which they share – the created and uncreated are like this – than if they do share some entity, and contraries are like that. Therefore, the created and the uncreated can surely not be united in the same entity.

The fourth argument goes like this: to incarnate is to act, therefore to become incarnate is to be acted upon; the Word, however, cannot be acted upon, and therefore, cannot become incarnate either.

These are the usual arguments.

Fifthly, then, it is argued with other, special, arguments, which produce major difficulties. The arguments go like this:

First, an argument departing from the nature which is assumed: by the same thing, human nature actually exists and is a person; therefore

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1. *Utrum sit possibile naturam humanam personaliter uniri Verbo divino* [Is it possible to personally unite human nature with the divine Word?]

2. Circa distinctionem primam tertii libri quaeritur primo utrum sit possibile naturam humanam personaliter uniri Verbo divino.

3. Quod non:
   Primo, quia actus purus et infinitus non est alteri componibilis, sicut nec in se est compositus, propter eius infinitatem et actualitatem; sed Verbum divinum est actus purus et infinitus; ergo non est alteri componibilis. Sed natura humana non potest uniri Verbo nisi per compositionem cum eo; ergo etc.

4. Confirmatur: non est possibilis unio alicuius cum alicuius nisi sit ibi additio alicuius ad alterum, quia non est possibilis additio alicuius cum alicuius nisi sit ibi aliquid quod prius non fuit; sed infinito nihil potest addi.

5. Secundo sic: unibilia sunt proportionabilia; sed nulla est proportion finiti ad infinitum; ergo non sunt unibilia. Quare etc.

6. Tertio sic: contraria non sunt unibilia eidem, ut patet ex IV *Metaphysicae*; sed maior est distantia sive diversitas eorum quae nulam entitatem participant communem – cuismodi sunt creatum et increatum – quam quae aliquam entitatem participant, cuismodi sunt contraria; creatum igitur et increatum multo fortius non possunt uniri in eodem.

7. Quarto sic: incarnare est agere, ergo incarnari est pati; sed Verbum non potest pati, igitur nec incarnari.  
   Istae sunt rationes comunes.

8. Quinto igitur arguitur per alias rationes, speciales, quae maiores difficultates important. Et hoc sic:
   Primo, ex parte naturae assumptae, quia eodem natura humana est actu existens et persona; ergo est impossibile quod sit natura humana...
actu existens et non persona personalitate illius naturae. Consequentia patet: nam si eodem est aliquid album et coloratum, incompossibile est quod sit coloratum et non sit album, – quia si coloratum, igitur habet illud quo est coloratum et illud idem est quo est album; igitur habet illud quo est album, et per consequens est album.

8 Antecedens ostenditur multipliciter:
Primo sic, quia existentia actualis est naturae humanae per se; sed existentia in natura rationali videtur sufficere ad personalitatem; igitur si natura humana habet propria existentiam, habet et propria personalitatem, ita quod eodem est persona et existens, – personata igitur existentia. Arguitur ulteriorius sic, quia incompossibile est naturam humanam uniri Verbo nisi habeat existentiam propria (unde oportet quod sit actualiter existens existentia propria, quia si non sit existens, tunc nulli ita est unibilis); sed non est unibilis existentia increata, quia Verbum divinum nulli est forma; igitur si natura humana uniat Verbo, hoc erit in propria personalitate, – quod est impossibile.

9 Secundo probatur idem antecedens sic: si non eodem est natura humana existens et personata, igitur personalitas adderet supra naturam humanam, – sed non addit nisi respectum ad causam efficientem, quae efficat istam unionem; sed dictum est in II quod relation creaturae ad Deum in ratione causae efficientis est eadem res cum suo fundamento; ergo etc.

10 Tertio ostenditur idem sic: sicut natura se habet ad singularitatem, sic singularitas ad personalitatem; sed eadem realitate aliquid est natura et 'haec natura singularis' sicut eadem realitate aliquid est lapis (habens naturam lapidis) et 'hic lapis', quia aliter posset lapis aliquis manere sub natura lapidis et habere aliam singularitatem; ergo eadem singularitate est aliquid natura et talis natura personata.

11 Sexto principaliter arguitur, et hoc ex parte personae ad quam debet fieri unio: in iis quae sunt realiter idem, non potest unum esse it is impossible that human nature actually exists yet is not a person in virtue of the personhood of that nature. The entailment is obvious, for if something is white and colored by the same thing, it is incompossible that it is colored and not white; for if colored, then it has that by which it is colored, and that same is that by which it is white; therefore it has that by which it is white, and, consequently, is white.

The antecedent is shown in various ways:
The first way goes like this. Actual existence belongs to human nature as such. Now existence in a rational nature seems to suffice for having personhood. Therefore, if human nature has its own existence, it also has its own personhood, such that by the same thing it is a person and existing, thus, personified existence.

Moreover, it is argued like this. It is incompossible that human nature is united with the Word, unless it has its own existence (therefore it must be the case that it actually exists with its own existence, because if it does not exist, then it cannot be united with anything in this way). Now it cannot be united with uncreated existence, because the divine Word is not a form for anything; therefore if human nature is united with the Word, it will be in its own personhood – which is impossible.

Secondly, the same antecedent is proved like this. If it is not the case that by the same thing human nature is existent and personified, then personhood would add to human nature – but it only adds a relation to the efficient cause, which brings that union about. Now it was said in Lectura II that the relation of creature to God in his quality of efficient cause is the same as its foundation. Therefore, human nature cannot be united with the Word.

Thirdly, the same is shown like this: Just as nature is related to individuality, so is individuality related to personhood. Now something is both nature and ‘this individual nature’ by the same reality, just as something is both stone (having the nature of stone) and ‘this stone’ by the same reality, for otherwise a stone could remain under the nature of stone and have another individuality; therefore it is by the same individuality that something is a nature and ‘this personified nature’.

Sixth it is argued (taking up the main order of arguments), and this time departing from the person with whom the union must be made: in
terminus realis alicuius et non aliud (ubi enim est sola differentia rationis, unum non potest esse terminus realis nisi aliud sit, quia consideratio rationis non sic facit ipsum esse tale secundum quod terminat aliquam realem unionem); sed persona et essentia sunt idem realiter, et differentia sola ratione (aliter enim persona non esset simplex); ergo non potest esse unio naturae humanae nisi unitatur essentiae. Sed consequens est falsum, ergo etc.

12 Septimo sic: suppositum terminat dependentiam naturae sibi unitae; sed persona divina – in quantum distinguitur ab alia – est relativa et distinguitur re relativa; igitur si natura humana uniretur Verbo divino, Verbum divinum relatione formaliter terminaret illum dependentiam. Sed hoc est falsum, quia natura humana est quid absolu- sum, igitur non dependet nisi ad aliquid absolum; unde oportet terminans dependentiam alterius esse magis absolum quam dependens, aliter enim eiusmod dependentiam non terminaret.

13 Octavo sic: omnis dependentia est ad aliquid prius naturaliter, – sed omne prius naturaliter vel est causa vel causatum prius eiusdem causae; sed Verbum non est aliquid causatum prius; si ergo sit aliqua unio naturae ad Verbum, hoc erit per relationem ad Verbum ut ad causam efficientem unientem. Sed relatio creaturae ad Deum ut ad causam efficientem est relatio ad totam Trinitatem, quae tota efficit et causat; ergo si natura humana uniat Verbo in personalitate, et toti Trinitati, – quod est falsum.

14 Nono sic: relatio non est alia res a suo fundamento, quia relatio non facit compositionem cum suo fundamento (album enim simile non est compositus quam album tantum); sed unio naturae humanae ad Verbum, si sit relatio quaedam, non est res alia a natura humana unita; igitur nulla est realitas alia in natura humana non-unita et unita. Sed non dicuntur aliqua extrema uniri nisi aliquid sit realiter in uno extremo quod prius non fuit, ut prius probatum est4, – nec etiam in Verbo, quia non est ista unio naturae humanae ad Verbum.

those things which are really identical, it cannot be the case that the one is a real end term of something whereas the other is not (where there is only a rational difference, the one cannot be a real end term unless the other is as well, because a consideration of the rational aspect does not make it such in virtue of its being the end term of a real union). Now person and essence are really identical, and only have a rational difference (for otherwise ‘person’ would not be simple); therefore there cannot be a union of a human nature unless it is a union of the essence. The consequent, however, is false, therefore human nature cannot be united with the Word.

The seventh argument goes like this: a subject is the end term of the dependence of the nature united with it; the divine person, however – in so far as it is distinguished from other persons – is relative and is distinguished by something relative. Therefore, if human nature were to be united with the divine Word, the divine Word would formally be the end term of that dependence by that relation. Now this is false, since human nature is something non-relative, and thus only depends on something which is non-relative; therefore the end term of the dependence of something else ought to be more non-relative than what is dependent. Otherwise it would not be the end term of its dependence.

The eighth argument goes like this: every dependence is related to something which is naturally prior, and everything that is naturally prior is either a cause or earlier caused by that cause. Now the Word is not something which is caused earlier; if therefore there is a union of a nature with the Word, this will be by relation with the Word as a uniting efficient cause. Now a relation of creature with God as a uniting efficient cause is a relation with the whole Trinity, which effects and causes as a whole; therefore if human nature is united with the Word in his personhood, it is also united with the whole Trinity, – which is false.

The ninth goes like this: a relation does not differ from its foundation, because a relation does not establish a composition with its foundation (for being similar to white is not more composite than simply being white). Now the union of human nature with the Word, if it is a relation, is not different from human nature united; therefore in non-united human nature there is no other reality than in united human nature. Now we say that terms unite only if there is something real in one term which was not there before, as was shown before4, – and not in

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15 Contra:  
Ioan. 1: *Verbum caro factum est*, et ponitur pars principalior pro toto; ergo *Verbum homo factum est.*

[I. – Ad quaestionem]

16 Respondeo ad quaestionem quod ad inquirendum quomodo incarnatio sit possibilis, primo videndum est quid intelligitur per hoc quod diciitur quod ‘natura humana unitur personae Verbi’, et ulterius per hoc quod diciitur naturam uniri ‘personae naturae alterius’; et secundo, quomodo possibile sit naturam humanam uniri Verbo.

[A. – Quid intelligitur per personalem unionem]

17 De primo dico quod unio naturae humanae ad Verbum non dicit formaliter aliquod absolutum in extremo altero. Utrum autem concomitetur aliquod absolutum vel non, dictetur posterius; formaliter tamen non dicit nisi respectum.

18 Respectus autem dividitur, quia quidam est eiusdem rationis in utroque extremo, sicut relationes quae fundantur super unitatem (ut ‘simile’ in uno extremo et in alio); quidam autem est respectus alterius rationis in uno extremo et in alio, sicut relationes suppositionis et superpositionis (ut paternitas et filiation). Unio autem ‘in universal’ accepta est mutua in unitis extremis, — sed ‘in speciali’ est alterius rationis in utroque extremo, sicut alio modo unitur materia formae et alio modo forma materiae ( prima enim unio est potentiae actui, sed secunda e contra), et sic de aliis. Naturam vero uniri personae alterius naturae non est unio eiusdem rationis, sed est e contra, quia nec natura et persona sunt eiusdem rationis; unde nec unio mutua est eiusdem rationis.

19 Loquamur igitur de unione naturae ad personam et suppositum. Ista est relatio posterioris ad prius, quia non habet natura subsistentiam nisi in quantum unitur personalitati; sed posterioritas
ad prius naturaliter vel est effectus ad causam vel effectus causati posterioris ad causatum prius. Sed neutro modo referitur natura ad Verbum secundum unionem personalem, quia unio personalis facit illud cui unitur esse tale formaliter quale est illud quod unitur; sed nulla relatio causae ad effectum facit causam esse talem formaliter quale est causatum. — Similiter, manifestum est quod in proposito non est relatio secunda, quae est causati posterioris ad causatum prius.

Ideo non invenitur aliqua unio similis unioni naturae ad personam alterius naturae nisi unio accidentis ad subiectum.

Quod sine aliqua assertione sic potest declarari: Substantia comparatur ad accidentis non tantum in ratione causae efficientis et materialis, sed in ratione etiam alicuius alterius prioritatis, secundum quam accidentis dependet ad substantiam, — et non in ratione alicuius generis causarum. Nam licet perfectionis sit in substantia quod sit causa efficiens accidentis, non tamen dicitur formaliter talis quale est accidentis propter rationem causae efficientis, — sed substantia formaliter denominatur et dicitur esse talis quale est accidentis, prout accidentis unitur ei et terminat dependentiam illius unionis quae est accidentis ad subiectum. Quod etiam substantia sit causa materialis respectu accidentis, hoc est imperfectionis in substantia, quia secundum hoc substantia est in potentia et accidentis actus eius; sed esse illud ad quod dependet aliud, non est imperfectionis. Et ideo est aliqua alia prioritatis substantiae respectu accidentis, quae non includit ipsam perfici et informari, licet ipsum ‘terminare dependentiam accidentis’ concomitetur informatio. Unde sequitur quod substantia non terminat dependentiam accidentis nec in ratione causae efficientis nec in ratione causae materialis; et ideo aliqua alia prioritate terminat eius dependentiam, et hoc est in quantum substantia est actus quidam prior accidente. Unde substantiam esse priorem accidente et ipsam non dependere ad aliud, non est ipsum esse causam materialem et perfici accidente, licet concurrant. Similiter, ex hoc quod substantia est causa efficiens et materialis accidentis, ex hoc tamen non dicitur qualiter informatur accidente, et ideo est aliqua alia prioritas substantiae respectu accidentis a prioritate causae efficientis et materialis.

This can be explained as follows, without any ‘assertion’:

Substance is related to accident not only in virtue of being efficient and material cause, but also because of some other priority, according to which the accident depends on the substance, — and not in virtue of being some kind of cause. For although there is perfection in the substance which is the efficient cause of an accident, one does not say that it is formally such that it is an accident because of the efficient cause. Rather, substance is formally denominated and said to be such as the accident is, insofar as accident is united with it and is the end term of dependence of that union which is that of an accident related to a subject. That substance is also the material cause with respect to the accident, that is an imperfection in the substance, because in virtue of this feature substance is in potentiality, and the accident is its act. However, being that on which something else depends, is not an imperfection. And therefore there is another priority of substance over accident, which does not include being perfected and informed, although ‘being the end term of the dependence of accident’ implies informing. So it follows that the substance is not the end term of the dependence of the accident, neither as efficient cause nor as material cause; and therefore its dependency has its end term by some other priority, and this is insofar as substance is an act prior to the accident. Thus, that substance is prior to the accident and does not itself depend on something else, does not mean that it itself is the material cause and is perfected by the accident, although they concur. Similarly, to say that substance is the efficient and material cause of the accident, does not mean that it is said also how it is informed by the accident, and posteriority related to something naturally prior either is related as effect to cause or as the effect of what is caused later to what is caused earlier. However, in personal union human nature is not related to the Word in either of these ways, because personal union makes that with which it is united formally the same as that which is united. No relation of cause to effect makes the cause formally the same as what is caused. Similarly, it is obvious that in the present case it is not the second kind of relation, i.e. that of what is caused later to what is caused earlier.

We therefore only find a union similar to the union of a nature and the person of another nature if it is a union of an accident and a subject.
therefore there is some other priority of substance over the accident than the priority of efficient and material cause.

And this is how it is in the present case: person is naturally prior and is the end term of the dependence of the assumed nature, not by a priority of efficient or material cause. Therefore, ‘a nature being united with a person of another nature’ means that it depends on that person, not by a dependence of that which is caused on a cause, nor by a dependence of that which is caused later on that which is caused earlier, but by a dependence similar to the dependence of an accident on a subject (insofar as it is the bearer of an accident, but not insofar as the accident informs the subject itself). And I don’t know how to name it by another name.
Sancto est entitas independens, cum sit aliquid intrinsecum in divinis (sive dicat formaliter perfectionem sive non); ergo entitas Verbi potest terminare dependentiam illius naturae quae potest ei ut sic dependere; — sed natura humana potest sic dependable ad Verbum (ut probabitur articulo sequente), et hoc secundum dependentiam talis rationis ad entitatem illius suppositum propriam sibi; igitur suppositum Verbi, in quantum tale, potest terminare dependentiam unionis naturae humanae ad ipsum.

25 Alii tamen arguunt sic: ad hoc quod aliquid possit in effectum in quem potest alia causa, non requiritur nisi quod habeat virtutem causalitatis illius causae; sed personalitas creatae potest terminare dependentiam naturae humanae. Nunc autem personalitas divina includit perfectius omnem personalitatem creatam; ergo potest terminare dependentiam naturae humanae.

26 Sed quod istud argumentum sit contra eos, probo. Dicunt enim quod entitas personalis non est entitas nisi relativa, et per consequens non est entitas formaliter includens perfectionem (sicut et ipsi concedunt), licet non sit entitas includens imperfectionem; sed includens entitates et personalitates quascumque, includit perfectionem in se. Quomodo enim est possibile quod in se includat omnes personalitates et entitates, nisi in se includat perfectionem? Si igitur personalitas divina includit formaliter alias personalitates, oportet dicere consequenter quod includat perfectionem et quod de se dicat perfectionem; et similiter, si non includat perfectionem, non includit formaliter infinitas personalitates nec earum perfectiones.

27 Si dicas quod personalitas Verbi ut est in essentia sic dicas quod personalitas Patris est in essentia, quae tamen terminat dependentiam naturae; si etiam dicas quod Filius habet essentiam ut in se, et sic natura unitur essentiae ut in Verbo; — contra: ita Pater habet voluntatem ut in se et Pater vult voluntate ut in se, et Filius similiter, et tamen una voluntate voluntatem (unde Pater creat voluntate ut in se, et Filius, et similiter Spiritus Sanctus, et tamen omnes una creatione et voluntate creant; unde Pater non creat voluntate ut in Filio, nec e end term of the dependence of human nature in sofar as it is such a subject, because any independent entity can be the end term of the dependence of that which can depend on it. The entity by which the Word is distinguished from the Father and the Holy Spirit is an independent entity, because it is something intrinsic in God (whether it is formally called a perfection or not). Therefore, the entity of the Word can be the end term of a dependence of that nature which can depend on it in such a way. Now human nature can depend on the Word in such a way (as will be proven in the next article), and this in virtue of this kind of dependence on that subject’s entity which is proper to it. Therefore, the subject of the Word, taken in this respect, can be the end term of the dependence of the union of human nature on itself.

Others, however, argue in this way: the fact that something can effect what another cause can effect, only requires that it has the causal power of that cause. Now created personhood can be the end term of the dependence of human nature. However, divine personhood includes all created personhood in the most perfect way. Therefore, it can be the end term of the dependence of human nature.

I show, however, that that argument contradicts their position. For they say that personal entity is only a relational entity, and thus, it is not an entity formally including perfection (as they grant as well), although it is not an entity including imperfection either. Now that which includes entities and personhood of any kind, includes perfection in itself. For how is it possible that it includes all kinds of personhood and entities, if it does not in itself include perfection? If therefore divine personhood formally includes other kinds of personhood, then we must say per consequent that it includes perfection and that it has perfection from itself, and similarly, if it does not include perfection, it does not formally include infinite kinds of personhood nor their perfections.

If you say that it is the personhood of the Word as it is in the essence – in the way you say that the personhood of the Father is in the essence, which nevertheless is the endterm of the dependence of the human nature –, and if you say that the Son has the essence as it is in himself, and thus the nature is united with the essence as it is in the Word – against that argument: the Father has the divine will as it is in himself and the Father wills by the will as it is in himself, and similarly the Son, and yet they will everything by one will (hence the Father creates by the
contra). Igitur similiter, si Filius ‘essentiā ut in se’ terminaret dependentiam naturae, omnes personae una personalitate personarent et una non sine alia, si personarent per essentiam, licet Pater personaret per essentiam ut in se et Filius per eam ut in se. Non ergo ex perfectione personae ‘unde persona’ arguitur propositum, sed ex entitate non dependente, quae potest esse terminus dependentiae quae potest esse respectu talis entitatis. Unde patet quod non est repugnantia Verbum incarnari, nec in ista unione est repugnantia ex parte qua est persona, nec ex parte qua est ‘haec persona’, scilicet Verbum.

[2. – De possibilitate ex parte naturae assumptae]

Secundo ostenditur quod non sit repugnantia in illa unione naturae ad Verbum ex parte unitae naturae. Sed hoc ostendere est difficilior.

[a. – Opinio aliorum]

Quod autem aliqua natura sit personabilis personalitate alterius naturae, ostendunt aliqua tripli.

Primo sic: natura est prior supposito, et etiam natura ut singularis est prior supposito, quia omne suppositum est natura singularis, non e contrario; sicut autem natura ad suppositum, sic suppositum ad personam; suppositum igitur est prius quam persona. Deus autem potest influere in primum, etsi non in secundum, – et in illud quod prius est, non influendo in illud quod posterior est; potest igitur influere in singularitatem personae non influendo in personalitatem ipsius, et sic natura singularis potest personari non propriam personalitatem, sed alienam.

Secundo ostenditur quod non sit repugnantia in illa unione naturae ad Verbum ex parte unitae naturae. Sed hoc ostendere est difficilior.

[a. – Opinion of others]

Some theologians show that a nature can be personified by the personhood of another nature, in three ways:

The first way runs like this: nature is prior to subject, and nature in its individuality is also prior to subject, because every subject is a individual nature, not the other way around. Now just as nature is related to subject, so subject is related to person. Therefore, subject is prior to person. God can have influence in the first but not the second – and in what is prior, not having influence in that which is posterior. Therefore, God can have influence in a person’s individuality, without having influence in its personhood and so the individual nature can be personified not by its own personhood, but by another.

The second way runs like this: “A thing of one genus can have the mode of another (like substantial difference is called ‘qualis’, therefore
qualitatis», – igitur substantia potest habere modum accidentis; sed hoc est ‘naturam humanam uniri Verbo’, scilicet habere dependentiam ad Verbum, similem dependentiae accidentis ad substantiam praeter quod informet.

31 T e r t i o sic: quanto aliqua magis conveniunt secundum univocationem, tanto minus sunt unabilia; – et quanto magis recedunt ab univocatione, tanto magis accedunt ad unibilitatem, unde et supposita unius speciei minime sunt unabilia; sed genera generalissima (ut substantia et quantitas) unabilia sunt; Deus autem et creatura maxime distant, ergo sunt maxime unabilia.

[a. – Opinionis improbatio]

32 Sed istae rationes non concludunt: Prima non, quia sequitur ‘hic lapis (loquendo de hypostasi sua), ergo lapis’, et non e contrario; igitur, secundum tuam rationem primam, posset Deus influere in singularitatem lapidis non influendo ad eius entitatem hypostaticam; igitur potest influere in lapidem aliquem in quantum ‘lapis’, et non in quantum ‘hic lapis’, et influere ad entitatem lapidis in quantum ‘lapis aliquis’, et non in quantum ‘hic lapis’; ergo extra intellectum potest manere lapis, loquendo de natura in isto lapide, et non esse singularis ut ‘hic lapis’, – quod est impossibile et est magis difficile quam propositum. Unde opereter ostendere quod alia res importetur per singularitatem et alia per personalitatem, ad hoc quod possit sic influere in uno non influencing in aliud, – et hoc patebit esse falsum, quia non alia realitas in essentia importatur per unum et alium. Quandu autem in una essentia continentur plures realitates, non potest illa essentia esse ‘illud’ et non illud quod per identitatem inclusum est in ipso ex hoc quod ipsum est (ut si sensitiva sit eadem essentia habens in se per identitatem vegetativam, non potest esse sensitiva nisi maneat realitas importata per vegetativam). Unde opereter ostendere quod alia re et ab alia sumitur singularitas et personalitas, ut sic possit esse unum sine alio; sed non est aliud realiter a quo accipitur singularitas et personalitas, ut patebit.
The Possibility of the Incarnation

Secunda etiam ratio non valet. Modus enim unius generis, sibi proprius, rei alterius generis competere non potest, quia ita est incompossibilis modus unius generis rei alterius sicut res rei. Unde Philosophus in V Metaphysicae non ponit species qualitatis, sed modos ‘qualis’; unde modi huius nominis ‘qualis’ conveniunt substantiae et accidenti, unde ‘qualis’ est modus differentiae ciuslibet generis; sed modus accidenti proprius non convenit substantiae, et ideo falsum primo accipitur in illa ratione. Inhaerere enim est modus proprius et reals, consequens accidens unde accidens; ergo oportet probare quod illud conveniret rei alterius generis.

Tertia similiter ratio non concludit. Angelus plus differt ab albedine quam corpus, quia est subjectum eius et causa, non autem angelus, et tamen angelus non est formaliter albus, sicut homo vel corpus – quod tamen sequeretur per rationem tuam. Unde genus subalternum substantiae, ut substantia corporea vel corporalis, magis convenit cum speciebus et genere subalternum alterius generis quam genera generalissima; unde substantia corporea unibilis est cum colore, non autem substantia incorporea. Et ideo tantum instatur in uno exemplo – in subiecto et accidente – quae sunt primo diversa; sed non est ex diversitate quod sunt unibilia, sed quia haec ‘potentia’ et hic ‘actus’ et hoc ‘subjectum’ illius. Sed non sic est in proposito: Verbum enim non est actus naturae ipsam informans. Et ideo non concludit illa ratio.

I say that it is necessary that personhood in human nature is such and with such a constitution, that it implies no contradiction for human nature to be without that personhood, so that human nature could keep its own individuality – without its own personhood – while going under the personhood of another person. This can be expounded in two ways, however.
Uno modo sic, quia sicut natura aliā realitate positiva formaliter est natura et ‘haec’ (sicut supra dictum est\textsuperscript{35}), sic aliā realitate positiva est haec natura singularis et hypostatica sive personata, ita quod sicut natura per entitatem singularitatis est indivisibilis in pluris naturas et repugnabit sibi dividi in plura individua, ita per entitatem personalitatis est sibi repugnans personari alia personalitate (illa manente). Et tunc Deus potest influere in priorem non influendo in posteriorem.

Alio modo potest hoc poni, quod personalitas non addat super ‘hanc naturam’, nec rem, nec modum rei, sed tantum negationem dependentiae. Et tunc potest Deus illum naturam sibi unire amota negatione.

Sed utraque via habet aliqua contra se. Nam ad primam viam consequuntur tria inconvenientia et absurda. Primum, scilicet quod non omnis entitas positiva in creatura sit ex se dependens ad personam divinam ut sibi uniri possit, quia impossible est illum entitatem manere quin maneat incomunicabilitas, cum per illam sit persona incomunicabilis, et per consequens esset incompossibilis Verbo entitas incomunicabilitatis. Et sic impossible esset totam realitatem meam manere in me et assumi personaliter a Verbo. Hoc autem videtur falsum: sicut enim natura humana tota dependet a tribus personis in entitate sua, ita tota dependet a Verbo quantum ad terminacionem dependentiae eius ad personalitatem. Non igitur est aliqua entitas positiva qua natura haec sit incomunicabilis.

Praeterea, si personalitas dicat entitatem positivam, illa erit ultima eius entitas et perfectissima. Si igitur entitas qua persona est persona, non unitur Verbo, caret actualitate ultimata quando assumitur a Verbo. Quod autem natura non habeat suam ultimatam perfectionem quando assumitur a Verbo, videtur inconveniens.

Praeterea, sequitur tertio quod Deus potest facere naturam humanam, et in nulla persona (nec creato, nec increato, nec in aliquo supposito) – probatio: quia si personalitas dicat entitatem positivam aliam quam singularitas, ergo potest natura humana produci a Deo in singularitate sine propria personalitate. Sed non tunc necessario sumitur a Verbo, quia aliter ex vi productionis assumetur – quod

One way goes like this: just as it is by another positive reality that human nature formally is a nature and ‘this’ nature (as has been said above\textsuperscript{35}), so it is by another positive reality that this nature is individual and hypostatic or personified; so that just as human nature cannot be divided into more natures in virtue of the entity of individuality and is incompatible with being divided into more individuals, so in virtue of the entity of personhood it is incompatible with being personified by another personhood (while the first personhood remains). And then God can flow into the former while not flowing into the latter.

The other way can be expounded like this: personhood does not add anything to ‘this nature’, neither something real, nor a mode of something real, but only the negation of dependence. Then, God can unite that nature with himself, if the negation is absent.

Now both ways have some points against them.

The first way implies three unacceptable and absurd points. Here is the first one: not every positive entity in a creature is from itself dependent on a divine person so that it can be united with him, because it is impossible that that entity remains when its incomunicability does, since by that entity a person is incomunicable and, consequently, the entity of incomunicability would be incompossible with the Word. It would be impossible in this way that my entire reality remains in me and is personally assumed by the Word. This seems to be false, however. Just as the entire human nature depends on the three persons in its existence, so it entirely depends on the Word as far as this is the end term of its dependence on personhood. Therefore, there is no positive entity by which this nature is incomunicable.

Moreover, if personhood expresses a positive entity, that will be its ultimate and most complete entity. So, if the entity by which a person is a person is not united with the Word, it lacks ultimate reality when it is assumed by the Word. However, that a nature does not have its ultimate perfection when it is assumed by the Word, seems unacceptable.

Moreover, in the third place, it follows that God can create human nature, yet in no person (neither in a created, nor in an uncreated person, nor in any subject). Proof: if personhood expresses a positive entity different from individuality, then human nature can be produced by God as having individuality without having its own personhood. However, then it is not necessarily assumed by the Word, since

\textsuperscript{35} English translation © Research Group John Duns Scotus
Contra secundam viam:
Si ‘natura haec’ esset personata tantum per negationem actualis dependentiae, tunc anima separata esset persona, quia non habet actualem dependentiam, cum actu non perficiat corpus, licet habeat aptitudinalem dependentiam.

Praeterea, sicut dictum est II libro, persona et individuum non constitutuntur in esse per negationem, quia negatio non est de se ‘haec’, nec propria nisi per affirmationem; unde negatio non est de se incommunicabilis. Unde ergo est quod haec negatio dependentiae est propria et incommunicabilis, cum omnis negatio de se sit communis?

Praeterea, videtur quod non potest salvare ratio personae in natura creata, quia si in ista natura creata humana non sit nisi entitas singularitatis, et huic non repugnat communicabilitas – ut probatur. Igitur non est ibi persona cui repugnat communicari, sicut individuo dividi. Assumpta probatur ex dictis, quia dependere est imperfectionis, sicut dividi, sed numquam repugnat aliqui imperfectioni nisi propter quid intrinsecum positivum, sicut nec individuo dividi. Si igitur non sit aliquid positivum in personalitate, ei non repugnabit dependere.

Ideo dico tenendo viam mediam: nam dicere quod personalitas dicat entitatem positivam ultra singularitatem qua natura est incommunicabilis personae divinae, est nimis attribuere creaturae. Ponere etiam quod personalitas tantum dicat negationem dependentiae actualis, est nimis parum attribuere personalitati. Ideo, inter haec mediendo, dico quod personalitas – ultra entitatem singularitatis in natura rationali qua natura est ‘haec’, importat negationem dependentiae actualis et aptitudinalis; nec tamen repugnat sibi quod dependeat ad personam naturae alterius, ut ad personam Verbi.

Quod declaratur sic:
Nam triplex est negatio: una scilicet, qua aliquid negatur ab alio quia affirmavitum sibi repugnat (ut ‘album non est nigrum’); alia est negatio qua aliquid negatur ab aliquo quia causa efficiens non causat otherwise it would be assumed in virtue of the production power – which is false.

Against the second way:
If ‘this nature’ were only personified by the negation of actual dependence, then the soul separated from the body would be a person, since it has no actual dependence, because in reality no body makes it complete, although it has dispositional dependence.

Moreover, as has been said in book II, person and individual are not constituted by a negation, since a negation is not ‘this’ by itself, nor is it proper unless by affirmation. Hence, a negation is not incommunicable by itself. Why, then, is it that this negation of dependence is proper and incommunicable, as every negation is general from itself?

Moreover, it seems that the notion of a person cannot be salvaged in a created nature: if there is only the entity of individuality in that created human nature, then it is not incompatible with communicability – as we prove. Therefore there is no person there for whom it is incompatible to be communicated, just as it is for an individual to be divided. The assumption is proved by what has been said: being dependent has some imperfection, just as being divided has, but an imperfection is only incompatible with something because of something intrinsically positive, just as being divided is incompatible with an individual. If, therefore, there is not something positive in personhood, then being dependent is not incompatible with it.

For this reason I say that a middle course is to be held, for by saying that personhood expresses a positive entity beyond individuality which by nature is incommunicable with a divine Person, one ascribes too much to a creature. By stating, however, that personhood only expresses the negation of actual dependence, one ascribes too little to personhood. Therefore, mediating between these two options, I say that personhood entails the negation of actual and dispositional dependence – beyond the entity of individuality in a rational nature by which a nature is ‘this nature’. Still, it is not inconsistent for this nature to depend on the person of another nature, namely on the Person of the Word.

This is to be explained as follows:

There are three kinds of negations: one by which something is denied of something else, since the affirmation is inconsistent (for instance: ‘something white is not black’); another negation is that by which
illud in eo (sicut ‘superficies non est alba’, quia causa efficiens non causat ibi albedinem). Et haec negatio duplex est, quia aut agens non agit ad quod passum natum est inclinari naturaliter, et tunc in illo passo est negatio alcuicus quod aptum natum est esse in eo (ut si esset ignis et non haberet calorem quem natus est habere, quia agens hoc non causavit in eo); aut quia agens non agit, nec causat in eo passo illud ad quod passum non naturaliter inclinatur, sibi tamen non repugnatur illud, et tunc in passo est negatio alcuicus ad quod est in potentia neutra, quia nec naturaliter, nec violenter inclinatur ad illud (sicut forte naturalia se habent ad formas artificiales).

...
Et ideo, licet natura singularis in Socrate posset personari personalitate divina, dum tamen est sub personalitate in Socrate, non est ibi violenter, quia non habet dependentiam naturalem, sed obedientialem respectu personalitatis divinae. Unde in tota entitate angeli et hominis est entitas positiva et negatio actualis dependentiae – non solum hoc, sed aptitudo ut non dependeat, quae aptitudo semper esset in actu nisi impediretur. Non est tamen repugnantia quin per potentiam obedientialem posset personari alia personalitate. Nec tamen est violentia quando est sub personalitate alia (ut divina), et non sub propria, quia obedit agenti respectu cuius est in potentia obedientiali. Et ideo quando Deus facit aliquà mirabilia, non facit contra naturam rei, sed facit secundum potentiam obedientialem in ipsa re.

47

Ad primum principale17, cum arguitur quod actus purus et infinitus non est componibilis, a l i q u i 18 faciunt vim in nomine ‘unionis’, dicentes quod unitur, sed non componitur; et verum est si compositio dicat unionem partis et partis. Non sic actus purus et infinitus est alicui componibilis, quia sic esse componible est esse potentiæ et pars habet perfectionem in toto quam non habet extra, quod non convenit infinito; unde actus purus et infinitus non est sic componibilis. Potest tamen dici ‘compositio’, sicut et ‘unio’; unde D a m a s c e n u s 19, libro III cap. 5 vel 6, concedit quod persona Christi est composita; ista enim compositio vel unio non est nisi dependentia naturae ad personam, prout prius descripta est dependentia.20

48

As to the first initial argument17, when one argues that pure and infinite act cannot be composed, some thinkers19 stretch the noun ‘union’, saying that it is united, but not composed. This is true if composition means the union of one part with another. Pure and infinite act is not capable to be composed with anything in this way, since being composed in this way is to be potential and a part has its perfection in its whole which it does not have outside this whole. This is not coherent with being infinite. Therefore, pure and infinite act cannot be composed in this way. Yet, it can be called composition, and, likewise, union. Therefore, John of Damascus19 grants in book III chapter 5 or 6 that the person of Christ is composed, for this composition or union is only a kind of dependence of the nature on the person, according to the way dependence is described before.20
As to the confirmation of the argument we have to say that the Word does not have every kind of being formally, since He is not formally stone, although stone is in a more eminent way in Him. In the way in which the Word does not have the human nature, can it be added to Him, namely according to its formal being – not according to another entity in order to make it more perfect, since this entity is in the Word in a more eminent way. Therefore, in the way it is in the Word human nature is not added to Him.

To the second point: when one argues ‘what can be united, can be proportioned’, I say that proportion is properly a geometrical concept, namely: taking something several times renders a new whole. In this sense it is not used in the issue to be discussed, but it is taken as a relationship of dependence. Thus, here it is the relationship of what depends on the end term of dependence, and in this way there can be proportion between the finite and the infinite.

As to the third point, when one argues that contraries cannot be at the same moment in this way, nor in the same way, therefore, the finite and the infinite, which are more different, we have to say that this is not a valid argument. For a white thing and a line are more different than a white thing and a black thing and yet the former things can be at the same moment, but the latter cannot. Therefore, the latter things, which have less in common, are called ‘different’, yet these things are not opposites or incompatible, for opposites agree in more things than different things. Hence, incompatibility does not exclude that things can go together in some respect; and therefore incompatibility, and not difference, is a reason why they cannot be at the same moment.

As to the fourth point claiming that to incarnate is to act, therefore being incarnated is being acted upon, it is said that this is not valid, because to know is to act and yet being known is not being acted upon. However, this is not the answer, since knowing is not an act affecting something else, nor being known, and therefore, what is known is not being acted upon. However, to incarnate is an act affecting something else, and in this way the end term of that act is – by consequence – being acted upon. Hence, it is necessary that something passive corresponds with it in what is passive. Therefore I say that there is a figure of speech in the argument, for uniting is causing a union which is a real relation in the creature. So, to incarnate is to act by uniting a nature. Therefore,
passionem, sed unionem circa Verbum, quae non est passio; unde 
Verbum non est obiectum circa quod fiebat actio, et ideo non patitur.

[B. – Ad rationes speciales]

53 [Ad quintum] – Ad quintum dicendum quod non alio positivo est 
natura haec existens actu et persona; non tamen eodem positivo quo 
ultimate est ‘natura haec’, est personata, sed cum negatione 
dependentiae actualis et aptitudinalis, et potest sine illa negatione.

54 Ad probationem, quando dicitur quod existentia per se in natura 
intellectuali sufficit ad personalitatem, dico quod est aequovatio de 
‘per se’. Nam ‘per se existere’ uno modo distinguuitur contra inhaerere 
accidentaliter, et haec ‘per se existentia’ non facit personam; unde 
licet prius dictum sit quod existentia naturae in persona alterius 
nature assimiletur existentiae accidentis, non tamen est ista talis 
qualis est illa. Alio modo dicitur ‘per se esse’ tertio modo perspettatis, 
sic licet ‘solitaria’, includendo negationem dependentiae actualis et 
aptitudinalis, – et sic convenit personae per se esse.

55 Ad secundam probationem, cum arguitur quod personalitas addit 
super naturam respectum ad causam efficientem, dicunt quod a m 
quod per se existentia dicit respectum non solum ad dictam causam 
efficientem et ad naturam divinam, sed ad voluntatem Dei, quae potest 
velle quod unum sit sine alio.

Contra quod, fiat una realitas et una res quae continet realitates! 
Non potest illa res manere nisi istae realitates maneat, – nec est 
mutatio a realitate ad realitatem, sed a re in rem.

Ido dico quod existentia actualis substantiae est ad se; nec tantum 
dicit respectum ad causam efficientem, sed dicit absolutum. Et ponatur 
quod dicat aliquid idem absolutum quod essentia; potest tamen esse 
licet personalitas non sit, quia non dicit illam negationem quae 
requiritur ad personalitatem, nec etiam ille respectus est ad causam 
efficientem qui importatur per personalitatem, sicut patet ex

it is action with regard to a nature and that nature is acted upon by 
something passive corresponding with that action; but to be incarnated 
does not signify that passive thing, but the union with respect to the 
Word and that is not something passive. Hence, the Word does not 
become the object of any action and, therefore, it is not acted upon.

[B. – To the special arguments]

As to the fifth point we have to say that it is not by another positive 
entity that this actually existing nature is also a person. Yet it is not 
personified by the same positive entity by which it ultimately is ‘this 
nature’, but by the negation of the actual and dispositional dependence; 
and it can exist without that negation.

As to the proof saying that in a rational nature existence by itself is 
sufficient for personhood, I say that there is an ambiguity in ‘by itself’. 
On the one hand, ‘to exist by itself’ is distinguished from to inhere 
accidentally and this ‘existence by itself’ does not constitute a person. 
Hence, although we have said before that the existence of a nature in a 
person of another nature is similar to the existence of an accident, yet 
the latter is not exactly like the former. On the other hand, ‘to be by 
itself’ is said to be in the third way of being-by-itself, namely, ‘on its 
own’, by including the negation of actual and dispositional dependence, 
and in this way being by itself is fitting to a person.

As to the second proof, arguing that personhood adds a relation to 
the efficient cause on top of human nature, some say that existence by 
itself expresses a relation not only to the aforementioned efficient cause 
and to the divine nature, but also to the divine will, which can will that 
the one is without the other.

Against that: one real entity is made and one thing, which contains 
real features! This thing can only remain if these real features remain – 
there is no change from one real feature to another either, but from one 
thing into another.

Therefore, I say that the existence of an actual substance is related to 
itself; it does not merely express a relation to the efficient cause, but 
expresses something non-relative. Now let us assume that it expresses 
something non-relative which is identical with the essence. Although 
there is no personhood, nevertheless it can exist, because it does not
praedictis; unde potest natura esse sine illo respectu, et ideo non est idem respectus ille cum fundamento suo, iuxta illa quae dicta sunt in II.

56 Ad tertium probationem dicendum quod natura quae est 'haec' de se, fit 'haec' per realitatem quae est eadem realiter cum illa natura; ideo non potest manere sine illa realitate quae est 'haec', quia illae realitates sunt una res. Sed persona non est personata personalitate positiva eadem cum realitate naturae et 'huius naturae', sed per negationem, quae potest auferri licet natura et singularitas maneat (sic dictum est et ideo non sicut natura ad singularitatem sic singularitas ad personalitatem; unde licet eodem realiter sit natura et 'haec', non tamen eodem realiter positivo est 'natura haec' et personata.

57 [Ad sextum] – Ad sextum principale: dictum est in I libro quod essentia et persona non tantum differunt ratione, quia sine operatione intellectus est ibi communicabilitas et incommunicabilitas; et ideo illa ratio probabiliter ostendit hoc quod ibi dictum est. Sed qualiter dicerent tenentes oppositum, videant ipsi.

58 [Ad septimum] – Ad septimum, cum dicitur quod suppositum divinum – unde tale suppositum – non potest terminare dependentiam naturae, quia oportet sic terminans dependentiam esse quid absolutum, dicitur a quibus d a m quod non solum suppositum Verbi potest terminare istam dependentiam ut terminus formalis, sed etiam dependentiam ad ipsum ut ad causam efficientem illius unionis, ponentes quod Verbum habet specialem efficientiam in uniendo sibi naturam, quae non est communis tribis personis; unde respectu illius unionis habet causalitatem specialem efficientiae et etiam formalem.

59 Quod autem specialem efficientiam habeat, pr o a n t 39, quia Verbum speciali illapsu illabitur naturae assumptae, sed pertinet ad genus causae efficientis. I t e m 40, Verbum assumit naturam; assumere autem est 'ad se sumere': hoc autem est agere – et ita habet actionem specialem in ista unione, quae aliis personis non est communis. Et ideo express that negation, which is required for personhood, nor is it that relation to the efficient cause entailed by personhood, as is clear from the things said before. Hence, a nature can exist without that relation, and therefore that relation is not identical with its foundation, in accordance with what was said in II.

As to the third proof we have to say that a nature which is ‘this’ from itself, becomes ‘this’ by a feature which is really identical with that nature; therefore it cannot remain without that feature which is ‘this’, because these features are one thing. Now a person is not personified by a positive personhood that is identical with a feature of her nature and of ‘this nature’, but by a negation, which can be taken away, although the nature and individuality remain (as has been said). Therefore, individuality is not related to personhood as nature is related to individuality. Hence, although it is by the same feature that a nature and ‘this’ are real, yet it is not by the same positive feature that ‘this nature’ and personified nature are real.

As to the sixth initial point it has been said in Book I that essence and person not only differ by a rational distinction, since communicability of nature and incommunicability of personhood obtain there without any activity of the intellect. And therefore, this sixth argument makes it plausible what has been said in that place. However, how they who hold the opposite would put it, is up to them.

As to the seventh point, when it is said that the divine subject – hence, such a subject – cannot be the end term of the dependence of the human nature, since in this case the end term of dependence has to be something non-relative, it is said by some that the subject of the Word can be the end term not only of this dependence, as a formal end term, but also of a dependence on itself as the efficient cause of this union. They state that the Word, in uniting the human nature to itself, has some special effectivity, which is not common to the three Persons. Hence, with respect to this union the Word has some special efficient causality, and even a formal one.

They prove that it has some special effectivity: the Word enters the assumed nature by a special entrance, but to enter belongs to the genus of efficient cause. Likewise, the Word assumes the nature, but to assume is ‘to take towards itself’, and this is to act – and thus it has some special activity in this union which is not common to the other
Filius dicitur « potentia operativa Patris ».

Secundo dicitur 41 quod respectu istius unionis habet etiam rationem causae formalis, non quidem formae supervenientis, sed formae terminantis, quia suppositum respectu naturae est ut totum. Totum autem habet rationem formae, ut patet per Philosophum 42 II Physicorum et per Avicennam 43 III Metaphysicae suae. Igitur, suppositum divinum habet rationem formae formaliter terminantis intervallum explicatum inter naturam et ipsum.

Sed utrumque istorum est falsum: Primum quidem, scilicet quod Verbum habeat specialem efficienciam in ista unione, quia dicit Magister 44 hic distinctione 1 quod tota Trinitas operata est unionem et eodem modo, licet tantum Filius terminet istam unionem.

Si dicas quod licet tota Trinitas operata sit istam unionem, tamen alio modo Verbum quam Pater, et ideo potest tradere sibi efficienciam specialem, – contra: non video quod si aliqua distinctio actionis trium personarum ad extra nisi in quantum consequitur principium originis illius, ut sic Pater dicatur ‘per Filium operari’ quia Filius non a se habet quod operetur sed a Patre, Pater autem a se habet. Sed secundum hoc non potest dici in proposito ‘quod Filius habet specialem actionem in ista unione’, quia si Pater fuisset incarnatus, et non Filius, alio modo secundum principium originis fuisset Pater operatus istam incarnationem quam Filius, quia Pater a se, et adhuc Filius operatus fuisset. Nulla igitur est efficiencia in una persona respectu huic unionis quae non sit in alia. Unde dico quod si antecedens 46 esset, quod illud dictum non bene saperet, quod scilicet una persona habeat aliquam operationem ad extra per voluntatem quam non habeat alia persona.


Persons. For this reason the Son is called “the operational power of the Father”.

Second, they say 41 that regarding this union, the subject of the Word also has the function of a formal cause, certainly not the function of a supervening form, but of a form which functions as an end term, since with respect to its nature a subject functions as a whole. The whole has the function of a form, as is evident from the Philosopher 42 in II Physics and from Avicenna 43 in Book III of his Metaphysics. Therefore, the divine subject has the function of a form which is the end term of the ontological space between the nature and itself.

However, each of these two arguments is false: certainly the first one, namely the argument that the Word has some special effectivity in this union, for here, in distinction 1, the Master 44 says that the entire Trinity has worked this union and in the same way, although only the Son is the end term of this union.

If you say 45: although the entire Trinity has worked this union, yet the Word does so in an other way than the Father, and therefore He can give him special effectivity, then there is a counterargument: I do not see that there is a distinction in the external activity of the three Persons, unless as far as it follows the principle of that origin. In this way the Father is said ‘to work through the Son’, because the Son does not have from himself that He works, but from the Father, but the Father has it from himself. Along these lines, however, one cannot say in this case ‘that the Son has some special activity in this union’, since if the Father had been incarnated, and not the Son, according to the principle of origin the Father would have worked this incarnation in another way than the Son since the Father does so from himself; nevertheless the Son would still have worked as well. With respect to this union, therefore, there is no effectivity in one Person which is not in another Person. Hence, I say: if the antecedent were the case 46, that proposition would not be wise, namely that one Person has some external working by the will which another Person does not have.

Against the second argument 47 stating that ‘the Word is the form with respect to nature and union, of which it is formally the end term’, I ask: Why is the subject of the Word said to be the form? You say: ‘Because He is the whole.’ However, this is incompatible with what you have said, for you say 48 that the subject adds only a negation to the
assumptae, sed Verbum-homo est totum. Ergo, habes dicere quod Verbum-homo est forma respectu naturae. Item, si partes unionis
comparantur ad invicem, natura magis haberet rationem formae quam persona ad quam dependet.

64 Ad illud igitur quod primo dicunt, quod ‘Verbum substantificat et
illabitur’, dico quod omnis illapsus qui potest ibi esse, pertinens ad
genus causae efficientis, est communis tribus personis, non nisi
secundum ordinem originis differens (ut quia scilicet Pater illabitur a
se, Filius autem non); sed illapsus – secundum quod natura est huius
personae, non alterius – est formalis, et secundum praedicationem
formealem Verbum est homo, quia natura assumpta est formaliter Filii,
et non Patris.

65 Ad secundum etiam quod dicunt, quod ‘Verbum est forma
respectu naturae, quia totum’, dico quod totum est falsum: si enim
ideo dicatur Verbum ‘forma’ quia terminat dependentiam naturae,
tunc Pater esset forma Filii et causa formalis eius, quia Pater terminat
habitidinem Filii ad Patrem.

66 Ad rationem ergo principalem dico: quando dicitur quod ‘nihil
terminat dependentiam naturae nisi absolutum’, dico quod hoc verum
est quando dependet ad alium naturaliter prius, ut ad causam (vel ut
causatum posterius ad causatum prius), quia causa dicitur esse causa
secundum formam suam et naturam, et ideo terminat dependentiam
ad ipsum secundum aliquid absolutum. Sic autem tota Trinitas in
ratione causae terminat dependentiam creaturae ad ipsam, per
voluntatem et essentiam, sed aliam dependentiam quae non est ad
Verbum in ratione alicuius causae sed quae est ad ipsum ut
suppositum, potest ut suppositum terminare (si autem suppositum
constituitur per relationem vel per aliquid absolutum, videas).

67 [Ad octavum] – Ad octavum patet per illud quod dictum est in
positione, quod scilicet est dependentia alia a dependentia causati ad
causam vel causati posterioris ad causatum prius. Ideo non sequitur.

68 [Ad nonum] – Ad nonum, cum arguitur quod ‘relatio non differt a
nature. Likewise, the Word is not the whole with respect to the assumed
nature, but the Word-man is the whole. Therefore, you should say that
the Word-man is the form with respect to the nature. Likewise, if the
components of the union are compared to each other, the nature would
have more the function of a form than the person it depends on.

Therefore, as to what they say first that ‘the Word sustains and
enters’, I say that all entering which can be there, belonging to the genus
of efficient cause, is common to the three Persons, being different only
according to the order of origin (because, for instance, the Father enters
by himself, but the Son does not). The entering, however, according to
which the human nature is the nature of this person and not of the
other, is formal; and according to formal predicication the Word is man,
since the assumed nature is formally the nature of the Son, and not of the
Father.

As to the second argument which says that ‘the Word is a form with
respect to the human nature, since He is the whole’, I say that this
whole argument is false. If it is said for this reason that the Word is the
form because He is the end term of the dependence of the nature, then
the Father would be the form of the Son and his formal cause, since the
Father is the end term of the relationship of the Son to the Father.

So to the initial argument I say: When one says that ‘only something
non-relative is the end term of the dependence of a nature’, I say that
this is true when it depends on something else which is structurally
first, as on a cause (or as what is caused later on what is caused earlier),
since a cause is called a cause according to its form and nature, and for
that reason it is the end term of the dependence on itself as something
non-relative. The entire Trinity is indeed causally the end term of the
dependence of the creature on it – by his will and essence. However, as
a subject it can be the end term of another dependence which is not
related to the Word as the cause of something, but which is related to it
as its subject. (Whether a subject, in turn, is constituted by a relation or
by something non-relative, you will see below).

As to the eighth argument, it is clear by what we have stated as our
position, namely, that this dependence differs from the dependence of
what has been caused on its cause, or of what has been caused earlier on
what has been caused later. Therefore, this argument is not valid.

As to the ninth argument, when one argues that ‘a relation does not
fundamento, dico quod sine mutatione Verbi natura humana est unita Verbo realiter, et prius fuit realiter non unita. Sed hoc non potest esse sine omni realitate nova, quia non sine omni mutatione. Ergo, aliqua realitas est in natura unita quae prius non fuit, et ideo illa relatio est alia realitas a natura unita. Unde ista ratio est pro me, quia probat quod relatio sit aliud a fundamento cuius contrarium est supra in II dictum. Unde tota natura humana posset personari a Verbo.

[III. – Dubium]

69 Sed an ad istam personalitatem concomitetur aliqua alia natura in qua fundetur relatio, vel non, sed quod immediate posset esse mutatio ad illam relationem (quia in natura non est mutatio), hoc indiget inquisitione. Supponendo igitur, secundum dicta, quod natura unita Verbo dependeat non ad essentiam in Verbo ita quod essentia non sit terminus dependentiae, nec etiam essentia in supposito (quia sic in eadem ratione Pater terminaret, ut argutum est), sed entitas suppositi Verbi (ut suppositum) terminet illam dependentiam; ponendo etiam, secundum dicta, quod personalitas non dicat entitatem supraplicitae cum qua stat potentia obiedentialis naturae singularis ad aliam personalitatem; – hoc, inquam, supponendo, tunc dubium est an illa natura quae prius sic non dependebat ad personam et modo per actionem dependet, posset sine aliqua realitate nova, quae sit fundamentum illius dependentiae, dependere.

70 Quod non, videtur, quia non est mutatio ad relationem immediate: non enim est mutatio ad relationem nec novitas in ipsa nisi facta aliqua novitate aut mutatione in altero extremorum vel ambobus, ut patet per P hil o so p h u m V P h y s i c u m; sed non est aliqua mutatio in Verbo quando natura est sibi unita et est nova relatio unionis naturae ad Verbum. Ergo, est mutatio in natura. Ergo, oportet differ from its foundation’, I say that the human nature has really been united with the Word without a change of the Word itself and that it was really not united before. However, this is not possible without some new reality, since it does not occur without any change. Therefore, in the united nature there is something real which was not there before, and, therefore, that relation is a reality different from the united nature. Hence, that argument is in favor of my position, since it proves that a relation is something else than its foundation. The contrary of it has been said above in Book II. Hence, the entire human nature can be personified by the Word.

[III. – A consideration]

It requires a closer examination, however, to see whether another nature on which the relation is founded does accompany that personhood, or whether it does not – but then a relational change could immediately occur (for there is no change in a nature). Let us assume then – according to what we have already said – that the nature which has been united with the Word, does not depend on the essence in the Word, so that the essence is not the end term of the dependence, not even as the essence in the subject (for then the Father would be an end term for the same reason, as we have argued), but that the entity of the subject of the Word (as subject) is the end term of that dependence. Let us also state – according to what we have already said – that personhood does not express an entity in addition to individuality, but only the negation of the aforementioned dependence, with which the obediential potentiality of an individual nature to another personhood is compatible. If, I say, we assume this, then there is a consideration whether that nature which did not in this way depend on the person before and now depends on it in virtue of an action, could depend on it without any new reality which is the foundation of that dependence.

It does not seem so, for there is no relational change immediately: there is only a relational change and something new in it if it is made by something new or some change in one of the terms or in both, as is clear from the Philosopher in Physics V. However, there is no change in the Word when the human nature has been united with him and there is the new relation of the union with the Word. Therefore, there is a change in
dare aliquam entitatem positivam, quae sit proprium fundamentum illius relationis.

71 Si dicas quod (secundum ipsum) hoc non est necessarium in relatione unionis, quia Verbum potest dimittere illud fundamentum absolutum et potest esse non existente relatione unionis, – ex hoc sequitur propositum, quod scilicet immediate ad relationem potest esse mutatio, vel oportet ponere aliud fundamentum in infinitum.

72 Respondeo ergo quod non video quare oporteat ponere aliquod novum fundamentum et aliquam naturam sive entitatem novam, quae sit fundamentum illius relationis quae importatur per unionem, – nam posito fundamento et termino relationis, ponitur ratio relationis sequitur fundamentum ex naturae rei, sicut posito hoc albo et illo, sequitur relatio similitudinis huius ad illud). Igitur si ista relation quae est naturae assumptae ad Verbum habeat novum fundamentum, non potest esse illud fundamentum sine relatione posito termino; sed terminus semper est; igitur Deus non potest facere illam entitatem in natura assumpta, nisi natura sit personata personalitate Verbi. Sed non est dare talem entitatem, ad quam necessario sequatur naturam personare naturaliter Verbi et ad quam sequatur Verbum necessario personare naturam creatam.

73 Praeterea, si illa relation requireret novum fundamentum, aut igitur illud est entitas substantialis aut accidentalis:

Primum non potest poni, quia aut est natura (ut materia vel forma), aut est realitas formalis quae continetur per identitatem in natura unita. Non primum, quia natura unita tunc esset compositior quam non unita, quia haberet plures materias vel plures formas quando est unita quam quando non. Si dicatur secundum, scilicet quod sit realitas contenta per identitatem in natura, – contra: natura quae continet aliquas realitates per identitatem, non potest esse sine illius (patet ex supradictis): si enim sensitiva continet vegetativam per identitatem, non posset esse sine illa respectu illius respectu cuius eam continet). Si igitur natura assumpta contineret per identitatem illud fundamentum, non posset esse sine realitate illius fundamenti; et per consequens non posset deponi natura assumpta, quia non maneret eadem numero sine the nature. Therefore, it is necessary to suppose a positive entity which is the proper foundation of that relation.

If you say that (according to him) this is not necessary in the relation of the union, since the Word can leave aside that non-relative foundation and can exist while that relation of the union does not exist, then the point under consideration follows from this, namely that there can be a relational change immediately, or else it is necessary to assume an infinite series of foundations.

Therefore, I reply that I do not see why it is necessary to assume a new foundation and some nature or new entity which is the foundation of that relation induced by the union. Given the foundation and the end term of the relation, we have the relation which follows from that foundation by its very nature (just like, given this white thing and that white thing, the relation of similarity between this and that thing follows). Therefore, if this relation which connects the assumed nature with the Word, has a new foundation, that foundation cannot exist without that relation, given the end term. However, the end term is always there. Therefore, God can only make that entity in an assumed nature, if that nature has been personified by the personhood of the Word. However, no such entity can be supposed, an entity from which necessarily follows that the nature has been personified by the Word, and from which follows that the Word necessarily personifies a created nature.

Moreover, if that relation were to require a new foundation, then that foundation is either an essential entity or an accidental one.

The first possibility cannot hold, since it is either a nature (for instance, matter or form) or a formal reality which is contained by identity in the united nature. The first alternative does not hold, since in that case the united nature would be more composite than the non-united nature, since it would have more kinds of matter or more forms when it has been united than when it has not been. If the second alternative is brought forward, namely that it is reality, contained by identity in the nature, the following objection holds: a nature which contains realities by identity, cannot be without them (this is clear from what has been said above): if sense-gifted reality contains by identity vegetative reality, it cannot be without that vegetative reality in terms of identity with respect to that sense-gifted reality which contains the
Verbo cui unitur, – nec etiam natura prius non unita et postea unita esset eadem numero, quia realitas quae continetur per identitatem non esset eadem numero.

74 Nec potest dici quod fundamentum relationis illius unionis sit aliquod accidens, quia illa natura quae unitur et quae est fundamentum unionis est personabilis personalitate Verbi; sicut igitur non est persona aliquo accidente, sic nec est personabilis aliquo accidente.

75 Ideo dico: sicut ponitur in primo membro dicto ‘non est aliqua entitas cui repugnat manere sine unione ad Verbum’, ita nunc ponendum – in secundo – quod nulla est realitas quae necessario dependens sit ad Verbum dicta\textsuperscript{60} dependenti\textsuperscript{60} unionis, ita quod non esset illa entitas nisi uniretur et natura assumeretur, sed potest tota entitas assumi et non assumi.

76 Dico igitur quod ista propositio est falsa quae dicit quod relatio non potest de novo advenire nisi habeat fundamentum novum in alio extremo (uno vel in altero): falsa enim est in omnibus relationibus quae non consequuntur necessario extrema posita.

77 Quaedam enim est relatio, cuius fundamentum non potest esse sine termino et altero extremo relationis, et per consequens non potest sine illa relatione esse. Et illa relatio est eadem cum fundamento, sicut dictum est in II.\textsuperscript{61} Unde relatio quae necessario consequitur alterum extremum, eo quod non potest illud extremum esse sine altero, non est necessario accidentalis (sicut est de relatione creaturae ad Deum: nam creatura non potest esse sine Deo). Ideo posito extremo, necessario ponitur alterum extremum. Sed positum fundamentum et terminis relationis, ponitur relatio. Ergo, creatura posita, necessario ponitur relatio eius ad Deum, et ideo non est alia res relatio illa a creatura.

78 Alia est relatio, respectu cuius ambo extrema sunt una causa, et consequitur illa sicut unam causam sufficientem (sicut est relatio similitudinis, quae consequitur duo, et est huius ad hoc, et e contra); vegetative one). If, therefore, the assumed nature were to contain by identity that foundation, it could not be without the reality of that foundation. Consequently, the assumed nature could not be laid down, for it would not remain numerically identical without the Word with which it is united – nor would the nature which is not united earlier and is united later, be numerically identical, since the reality which is contained by identity, would not be numerically identical.

Nor is it possible to say that the foundation of the relation of that union is something accidental, for that nature which is united, and which is the foundation of the union, is personifiable by the personhood of the Word. Therefore, just as it is not a person by an accident, it is neither personifiable by an accident.

For this reason I say: just as we assert in the first member, namely: ‘every entity can remain without the union with the Word’, we have to assert now – in the second member – that there is no reality which is necessarily dependent on the Word by the aforesaid\textsuperscript{60} dependence on the union, so that that entity would only be there if it were to be united and the nature were to be assumed, but the entire entity can be assumed and not-assumed.

Therefore, I say that this proposition is false, which says that a relation can only occur as a new one, if it has a new foundation in another term (in the one or the other term): it is false in all relations which do not necessarily follow from the terms which have been posed.

There is a certain kind of relation the foundation of which cannot exist without the end term and the other term of the relation, and, consequently, cannot exist without that relation. That relation is the same as its foundation, as has been said in II.\textsuperscript{61} Hence, a relation which necessarily follows from the other term by the fact that that term cannot exist without the other term, is not necessarily accidental (as is the case in the relation of the creation to God: the creation cannot exist without God). For this reason, given one term, we necessarily have the other term. Given the foundation and the end terms of a relation, we have the relation too. Therefore, given creation, we necessarily have its relation to God, and for that reason that relation is nothing else than creation.

Another kind of relation is that with respect to which both terms are one cause, and that relation follows from them as one sufficient cause (just as the relation of similarity does, which follows from both of them,
unde ista, licet non necessario consequatur alterum extremum sicut prae dicta relation, necessario tamen sequitur ambo extrema in se posita.

Tertia est relation, quae nec necessario consequitur alterum extremum nec ambo: et illae sunt omnes relationes unionis. Non enim unitates sunt eiusdem rationis in unitis, sicut patet de unionibus respectu numeri. Nisi dicas quod eo ipso quod est unitas, est pars numeri – saltem patet de materia et forma et de subjecto et accidente. Si materia potest separari et postea uniri, nihil absolutum intrinsecum advenit materiae per hoc quod nunc unitur et prius non. Quando etiam anima separatur a corpore, manet idem corpus organismum, nec aliquid intrinsecum animae auffertur per hoc quod non unitur, nec sibi advenit quod sit fundamentum illius unionis. Similiter de subjecto et accidente: quando substantia panis transubstantiatatur, manet quantitas sine proprio subjecto, nec aliquid deperit quantitati per hoc quod non unitur. Et si postea redeat subjectum suum et sibi uniatur, nihil absolutum novum quantitati advenit, sed tantum relation; unde tantum deperit et acquiritur nova relation.

In primo igitur modo relationis non potest mutatio ad relationem nisi ad fundamentum sit mutatio, quia illa relation est eadem cum fundamento. In secundo modo relationis non potest de novo acquiri relation nisi sit mutatio in altero extremo. Sed in tertio modo relationis potest immediate mutatio ad relationem, nec oportet aliquod absolutum innovari circa alterum extremorum.

Hoc autem patet de motu locali, qui non est ad aliquod absolutum: nam per motum localem non acquiritur loco fromus locus, quia per motum semper acquiritur aliquid quod est in moto, locus autem est in locante; unde non est aliquid nisi ‘ubi’. ‘Ubi’ autem est formaliter respectus, non autem aliquid absolutum, quia « ‘ubi’ est circumscrip to corporis locabilis » etc. Unde per motum non acquiritur nisi habitudo ad locum circumscribentem locatum. – Nec enim ego possim intelligere quod ipsi mobili aliquid positivum absolutum acquiritur ex hoc quod nunc and relates this and that, and conversely). Hence, although this relation does not follow necessarily from the one or the other term, as the aforesaid relation, yet it necessarily follows from both terms themselves, once given.

There is a third kind of relation which does not necessarily follow from one of the terms or from both: all relations of union are of this kind. In things united unities are not of the same nature, as is clear about unions with respect to number. Unless you say that by the fact that it is a unity, it is a part of a number – which is properly clear about matter and form and about subject and accident. If matter can be separated and united again later on, nothing which is intrinsically non-relative is added to matter by the fact that it is now united and not before. Even when a soul is separated from the body, it remains the same organic body, and nothing intrinsic to the soul is taken away by the fact that it is not united, and that which is the foundation of that union is not added either. With subject and accident it is similar: when the substance of bread is transubstantiated, the quantity remains without its own subject, nor is anything of the quantity lost by the fact that it is not united. If later on its subject returns and is united with it, nothing new which is non-relative is added to the quantity, but only the relation. Hence, only the relation is lost and a new relation is acquired. In the first kind of relation, then, there can only be a change with respect to the relation if there is a change with respect to the foundation, because that relation is the same as the foundation. In the second kind of relation a relation can only acquire something new if the change is in the other term. But in the third kind of relation there can be a change with respect to the relation immediately, and it does not have to be innovated by something non-relative with regard to the other terms.

This becomes clear in the case of local movement, which does not pertain to something non-relative: for by local movement no place is acquired by the thing that is moved, because by movement always something which is moving is acquired, whereas a place is in something that occupies place; hence, it is only a ‘where’. However, ‘where’ is formally a relation, not something non-relative, because “’where’ is the circumscription of a body that can be located” etc. Hence, by movement only a relation is acquired to a place which circumscribes something
est hic, nunc ibi. Qui autem potest intelligere intelligat, sed ego non possum alium intelligere.

Ad Philosophum \textsuperscript{63} igitur respondeo quod relatio, prout distinguitur ad alii respectibus, dicitur esse ‘intrinsecus adveniens’ non quia consequitur subjectum ex parte materiae aut formae (illa enim relatio quae non est alius a substantia rei, est respectu Dei), sed dicitur ideo esse ‘intrinsecus adveniens’, quia consequitur formas inhaerentes (ut quantitatem vel qualitatem); illae autem relationes non possunt advenire de novo sine novitate fundamenti in uno extre mo vel in alio. Unde de huiusmodi relationibus verum est dictum

Philosophum \textsuperscript{64} quod in ‘ad aliquid’ non potest immediate esse motus, sed altero mutato consequitur nova relatio. Ad relationem tamen importatam per ‘ubi’ potest immediate esse motus, nec oportet aliquam novitatem esse in altero extremo. Et sic etiam est in transubstantiatione panis, quod tantum ibi habitudo unionis destruitur et deperditur; et quando unitur, habitudo tantum unionis acquiritur. Et sic natura humana, personata personalitate propria, est in potentia obedientiali ut uniatur; et nulla realitas absoluta sibi advenit per hoc quod unitur.

[IV. – Ad rationes contra secundam viam in opinione propria enuntiatam]

Ad rationes positas contra secundam viam\textsuperscript{65}, per quae ostendebatur quod personalitas non tantum dicit negationem actualis dependentiae, quatenus sunt contra dicta, respondendum est. Et ad primam\textsuperscript{66}, de anima, patet quod non est contra dicta, quia ‘anima separata licet non habeat actualem dependentiam ad corpus, habet tamen aptitudinalem’; persona autem ultima singularitate in natura rationali non tantum dicit negationem actualis dependentiae, sed etiam aptitudinalis. Et intelligo quod illa aptitudo sit talis quod natura singularis, quantum est ex se, si non impeditur, habet dependentiam ad personam illius naturae.

that is moved. – For I cannot understand either what positive non-relative entity something mobile can acquire from the fact that it is now here, now there. However, who is able to understand, let him understand; but I cannot understand it otherwise.

To the Philosopher\textsuperscript{63} I therefore reply that a relation, insofar as it is distinguished from other relations, is said to be ‘something intrinsically additional’, not because it follows from the subject on the part of matter or form (for that relation which is not different from a thing’s substance, is the relation to God), but it is said to be ‘something intrinsically additional’ because it follows from inherent forms (like quantity or quality); those relations, however, cannot be added as new without something new in the foundation in the one or the other term. Hence, about relations of that kind the saying of the Philosopher\textsuperscript{64} is true: in ‘relation’ there cannot immediately be a movement, but once the term has changed, a new relation follows. Nevertheless, with respect to a relation indicated by ‘where’, there can immediately be a change, and there does not need to be something new in the other term. And this is also how it is in the bread by transubstantiation: here only the relation of union is destroyed and lost; and when united, only the relation of union is acquired. In this way, human nature personified by its proper personhood has an obediential potentiality for being united; and no non-relative reality is added by the fact that it is united.

[IV. – To the arguments against the second way mentioned in Scotus’ own answer]

We have to reply to the arguments put forward against the second theory\textsuperscript{65} by which it was shown that personhood not only expresses the negation of actual dependence, as far as they run counter what has been said. As to the first argument\textsuperscript{66} – the argument about the soul –, it is clear that it is not against what has been said: ‘Although a separated soul does not have an actual dependence on the body, it does have a dispositional one.’ By its ultimate individuality in a rational nature, ‘person’ not only expresses the negation of actual, but also of dispositional dependence. I understand this as follows: that disposition is such that, if it is not impeded, an individual nature, as far as it is from itself, depends on a person of that nature.
Concerning the second argument\textsuperscript{67} which says that ‘a negation is not incommunicable’, I say that ‘something is incommunicable’ can be understood in two ways: in one way, that something cannot be common to more things any one of which is ‘itself’; in the other way, that it is incommunicable by something, for instance, by the mode of a form.

The first kind of incommunicability fits an individual, and it does so by the positive entity by which it is individual. However, it does not fit individuality as far as individuality is meant in a non-relative sense (for the divine nature is individual, which can yet be common to more persons), but it does fit individuality as far as it is limited. Hence, it is absurd that this kind of individuality is there by something negative, since communicability is incompatible with individuality – there is only incompatibility because of something positive.

However, about the kind of incommunicability which is by the mode of a form and nature, I say that being personified is compatible with any individual nature (or communicability) when it can be personified by another personhood. For although a created person is characterized by the negation of actual and dispositional dependence, it is yet not inconsistent for an individual nature to be dependent on another personhood, for if it were inconsistent, it could in no way be communicated so that it could be assumed by another personhood. Hence, a person for whom it is inconsistent to be personified by another personhood, has something positive that accounts for the inconsistency, as is the case with a divine person. It is not inconsistent for a created person, however: while nothing obviates it to be personified by a personhood of its own nature, it still enjoys the obediential potentiality to be personified by another personhood. And therefore, in creatures the negations of actual and dispositional dependence are sufficient for an individual nature to be personified: for this individual nature in Socrates does not have an actual dependence on another person, because the agent does not need this – hence, that negation is there because of a defect of the agent. Nor does it have, similarly, a dispositional dependence on another personhood, for it does not have a natural, but only an obediential potentiality to that.

However, you will say that it follows then, that person is not of the same kind in uncreated and created nature if there it is inconsistent for a person to be personified by another personhood and not inconsistent.
Item, quomodo est possibile quod negatio sit propria, nec secundum eam sit propria personalitas, cum omnis negatio de se sit communis et communicabilis?

Ad primum respondoe quod persona quantum ad negationem aptitudinem hic et ibi [est eiusdem rationis], sed non quantum ad negationem possibilitatis, quia hic est possibile, ibi autem non.

Ad aliud, quando quaeritur quomodo est personalitas propria cum negatio non sit propria, dico quod singularitas est propria, – et quidquid entitatis et proprietatis est in persona positive, est a singularitate in natura rationali; unde per illam singularitatem concluditur illa duplex negatio. Quare autem singularitas requirit aliquid positivum, et non personalitas, patet ex iis dictis.

Ad tertium, cum arguitur quod non esset persona in creaturis quia quidquid entitatis est ibi potest communicari, patet quod non dicitur ‘persona’ in creaturis quia sibi repugnat communicabilitas (hoc enim solum convenit personae divinae; et ideo ibi est persona tantum completive, quantum ad omnem rationem personae); sed est persona creata propter duplicem negationem dependentiae, cum qua tamen stat potentia obedientialis ad aliam personalitatem, sicut patet ex dictis.
Endnotes

1 Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV c. 3 (1005b19-30).
2 See Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II d. 1 § 239 (XVIII 80).
3 Scotus started his list of ‘special’ arguments in § 7, of which the first was counted fifth in the main, consecutive order. He now resumes this main order.
4 See above, § 3.
5 See below, §§ 69-82.
6 See below, §§ 46-47.
7 The critical edition refers to William of Ware, *Sent.* III q.1.
8 The critical edition refers to William of Ware, *Sent.* I q.76 [d. 25 q. un]; q.79 [d. 26 q. 3]; q.80 [d. 26 q. 4].
9 *Ibidem*, q. 74 [d. 20 q. un.] ad 2.
10 The critical edition refers to various quotations of William of Ware, *Sent.* III q. 1 [d. 1 q. 1] for the three arguments below in §§ 29-31.
11 See note 10.
12 Sc. the solution proposed in § 29.
13 See below, § 72.
15 See § 32.
16 Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II d.3 §§ 45-53 (XVIII 242-244).
17 See above, § 2.
19 Johannes Damascenus, *De fide orthodoxa*, c. 49 [III c. 5] (FIP t.s. VIII 184, PG 94, 999).
20 See above, § 46.
21 See above, § 3.
22 See above, § 4.
23 See above, § 5.
24 See above, § 6.
25 The critical edition refers to Richard of Middleton, *Sent.* III d. 1 princ. 1 q. 1 arg. 5; St. Bonaventure, *Sent.* III d. 1 a. 1 q. 1 ad 1; Thomas Aquinas, *Sent.* III d. 1 q. 1 a. 1 ad 1.
26 See above, § 7.
27 See above, § 8.

28 See above, § 22.
29 See above, § 9.
30 The critical edition refers to William of Ware, *Sent.* III q. 4 [d. 1 q. 4].
31 See above, §§ 17-19.
32 See Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II d. 1 § 239 (XVIII 80).
33 See above, § 10.
34 See above, §§ 46-47.
35 See above, § 11.
36 Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I d.2 §§ 248, 259 (XVI 207-208, 211).
37 See above, § 12.
38 The critical edition refers to William of Ware, *Sent.* III q. 4 [d. 1 q. 4] and q. 1 [d. 1 q. 1].
39 The critical edition refers to William of Ware, *Sent.* III q. 15 [d. 5 q. 2]; q. 1 [d. 1 q. 1].
40 *Ibidem*, q. 14 [d. 5 q. 1]; q. 4 [d. 1 q. 4].
41 *Ibidem*, q. 14 [d. 5 q. 1]; q. 10 [d. 2 q. 4].
42 Aristotle, *Physics* II t. 31 (195a18).
43 Avicenna, *Metaphysica* III c. 2 (110).
44 Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae* III d. 1 c. 3 n. 2 (SB V 26-27).
45 The critical edition refers to William of Ware, *Sent.* III q. 4 [d. 1 q. 4].
46 See above, § 58.
47 See above, § 60.
48 The critical edition refers to William of Ware, *Sent.* III q. 17 [d. 5 q. 4] in corp. et ad 1.
49 See above, §§ 58-59.
50 See above, § 60.
51 See above, § 58 and § 12.
52 Scotus refers to *Lectura* III d. 5; see also *Lectura* I d. 26 § 1 (XVII 317).
53 See above, § 13.
54 See above, § 22.
55 See above, § 14.
56 See above, § 9.
59 See above, § 32.
60 See above, § 69.
61 Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II d. 1 § 238 (XVIII 80).
See above, § 77.
See above, § 70.
Aristotle as referred to in § 70. See also note 57.
See above, §§ 41-43.
See above, § 41.
See above, § 42.
See above, § 87.
Added by the editors of the critical edition, in line with § 87.
See above, § 88.
See above, §§ 85-86.
See above, § 43.
See above, § 86.