

John Duns Scotus

The possibility of the incarnation

Lectura III distinction 1 question 1
Latin text and English translation

Translated by

A. Vos

H. Veldhuis

G.H. Labooy

E. Dekker

K.L. Bom

N.W. den Bok

A.J. Beck

J.M. Bac

Research Group John Duns Scotus

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[Utrum sit possibile naturam humanam personaliter uniri Verbo divino]

- 1 Circa distinctionem primam tertii libri quaeritur primo utrum sit possibile naturam humanam personaliter uniri Verbo divino.
- 2 Quod non:
Primo, quia actus purus et infinitus non est alteri componibilis, sicut nec in se est compositus, propter eius infinitatem et actualitatem; sed Verbum divinum est actus purus et infinitus; ergo non est alteri componibilis. Sed natura humana non potest uniri Verbo nisi per compositionem cum eo; ergo etc.
- 3 Confirmatur: non est possibilis unio alicuius cum alio nisi sit ibi additio alicuius ad alterum, quia non est possibilis additio alicuius cum alio nisi sit ibi aliquid quod prius non fuit; sed infinito nihil potest addi.
- 4 Secundo sic: unibilia sunt proportionabilia; sed nulla est proportio finiti ad infinitum; ergo non sunt unibilia. Quare etc.
- 5 Tertio sic: contraria non sunt unibilia eidem, ut patet ex IV *Metaphysicae*;¹ sed maior est distantia sive diversitas eorum quae nullam entitatem participant communem – cuiusmodi sunt creatum et increatum – quam quae aliquam entitatem participant, cuiusmodi sunt contraria; creatum igitur et increatum multo fortius non possunt uniri in eodem.
- 6 Quarto sic: incarnare est agere, ergo incarnari est pati; sed Verbum non potest pati, igitur nec incarnari.
Istae sunt rationes c o m m u n e s .
- 7 Quinto igitur arguitur per alias rationes, speciales, quae maiores difficultates important. Et hoc sic:
Primo, ex parte naturae assumptae, quia eodem natura humana est actu existens et persona; ergo est impossibile quod sit natura humana

[Is it possible to personally unite human nature with the divine Word?]

- Regarding the first distinction of the third book it is asked first whether it is possible to personally unite human nature with the divine Word. 1
- It seems not to be so: 2
- First: pure and infinite act cannot be composed with something else, just as it is not composed in itself because of its infinity and actuality. Now the divine Word is a pure and infinite act. Therefore, it cannot be composed with something else. Human nature, however, can be united with the Word only by means of composition. Therefore, human nature cannot be united with the Word.
- Confirmation: a union of one thing with another is only possible if there is an addition of that thing to the other, because an addition of one thing to another is only possible if there is something which was not there before. Nothing, however, can be added to the infinite. 3
- The second argument goes like this: what can be united, can have proportion. However, the finite is in no proportion to the infinite. Therefore they cannot be united. For this reason human nature cannot be united with the Word. 4
- The third argument goes like this: contraries cannot be united in regard to the same thing, as is clear from the fourth book of the *Metaphysics*.¹ Now their distance or diversity is greater if there is not a single common entity which they share – the created and uncreated are like this – than if they do share some entity, and contraries are like that. Therefore, the created and the uncreated can surely not be united in the same entity. 5
- The fourth argument goes like this: to incarnate is to act, therefore to become incarnate is to be acted upon; the Word, however, cannot be acted upon, and therefore, cannot become incarnate either. 6
- These are the usual arguments.
- Fifthly, then, it is argued with other, special, arguments, which produce major difficulties. The arguments go like this: 7
- First, an argument departing from the nature which is assumed: by the same thing, human nature actually exists and is a person; therefore

actu existens et non persona personalitate illius naturae. Consequentia patet: nam si eodem est aliquid album et coloratum, impossibile est quod sit coloratum et non sit album, – quia si coloratum, igitur habet illud quo est coloratum et illud idem est quo est album; igitur habet illud quo est album, et per consequens est album.

8 Antecedens ostenditur multipliciter:

Primo sic, quia existentia actualis est naturae humanae per se; sed existentia in natura rationali videtur sufficere ad personalitatem; igitur si natura humana habet propriam existentiam, habet et propriam personalitatem, ita quod eodem est persona et existens, – personata igitur existentia. Arguitur ulterius sic, quia impossibile est naturam humanam uniri Verbo nisi habeat existentiam propriam (unde oportet quod sit actualiter existens existentia propria, quia si non sit existens, tunc nulli ita est unibilis); sed non est unibilis existentia increata, quia Verbum divinum nulli est forma; igitur si natura humana uniatur Verbo, hoc erit in propria personalitate, – quod est impossibile.

9 Secundo probatur idem antecedens sic: si non eodem est natura humana existens et personata, igitur personalitas adderet supra naturam humanam, – sed non addit nisi respectum ad causam efficientem, quae efficit istam unionem; sed dictum est in II quod relatio creaturae ad Deum in ratione causae efficientis est eadem res cum suo fundamento²; ergo etc.

10 Tertio ostenditur idem sic: sicut natura se habet ad singularitatem, sic singularitas ad personalitatem; sed eadem realitate aliquid est natura et ‘haec natura singularis’ sicut eadem realitate aliquid est lapis (habens naturam lapidis) et ‘hic lapis’, quia aliter posset lapis aliquis manere sub natura lapidis et habere aliam singularitatem; ergo eadem singularitate est aliquid natura et talis natura personata.

11 Sexto principaliter³ arguitur, et hoc ex parte personae ad quam debet fieri unio: in iis quae sunt realiter idem, non potest unum esse

it is impossible that human nature actually exists yet is not a person in virtue of the personhood of that nature. The entailment is obvious, for if something is white and colored by the same thing, it is impossible that it is colored and not white; for if colored, then it has that by which it is colored, and that same is that by which it is white; therefore it has that by which it is white, and, consequently, is white.

The antecedent is shown in various ways:

The first way goes like this. Actual existence belongs to human nature as such. Now existence in a rational nature seems to suffice for having personhood. Therefore, if human nature has its own existence, it also has its own personhood, such that by the same thing it is a person and existing, thus, personified existence.

Moreover, it is argued like this. It is impossible that human nature is united with the Word, unless it has its own existence (therefore it must be the case that it actually exists with its own existence, because if it does not exist, then it cannot be united with anything in this way). Now it cannot be united with uncreated existence, because the divine Word is not a form for anything; therefore if human nature is united with the Word, it will be in its own personhood – which is impossible.

Secondly, the same antecedent is proved like this. If it is not the case that by the same thing human nature is existent and personified, then personhood would add to human nature – but it only adds a relation to the efficient cause, which brings that union about. Now it was said in *Lectura* II that the relation of creature to God in his quality of efficient cause is the same as its foundation.² Therefore, human nature cannot be united with the Word.

Thirdly, the same is shown like this: Just as nature is related to individuality, so is individuality related to personhood. Now something is both nature and ‘this individual nature’ by the same reality, just as something is both stone (having the nature of stone) and ‘this stone’ by the same reality, for otherwise a stone could remain under the nature of stone and have another individuality; therefore it is by the same individuality that something is a nature and ‘this personified nature’.

Sixth it is argued (taking up the main order of arguments³), and this time departing from the person with whom the union must be made: in

terminus realis alicuius et non aliud (ubi enim est sola differentia rationis, unum non potest esse terminus realis nisi aliud sit, quia consideratio rationis non sic facit ipsum esse tale secundum quod terminat aliquam realem unionem); sed persona et essentia sunt idem realiter, et differunt sola ratione (aliter enim persona non esset simplex); ergo non potest esse unio naturae humanae nisi uniatur essentiae. Sed consequens est falsum, ergo etc.

- 12 Septimo sic: suppositum terminat dependentiam naturae sibi unitae; sed persona divina – in quantum distinguitur ab alia – est relativa et distinguitur re relativa; igitur si natura humana uniretur Verbo divino, Verbum divinum relatione formaliter terminaret illam dependentiam. Sed hoc est falsum, quia natura humana est quid absolutum, igitur non dependet nisi ad aliquid absolutum; unde oportet terminans dependentiam alterius esse magis absolutum quam dependens, aliter enim eius dependentiam non terminaret.
- 13 Octavo sic: omnis dependentia est ad aliquid prius naturaliter, – sed omne prius naturaliter vel est causa vel causatum prius eiusdem causae; sed Verbum non est aliquid causatum prius; si ergo sit aliqua unio naturae ad Verbum, hoc erit per relationem ad Verbum ut ad causam efficientem unientem. Sed relatio creaturae ad Deum ut ad causam efficientem est relatio ad totam Trinitatem, quae tota efficit et causat; ergo si natura humana uniatur Verbo in personalitate, et toti Trinitati, – quod est falsum.
- 14 Nono sic: relatio non est alia res a suo fundamento, quia relatio non facit compositionem cum suo fundamento (album enim simile non est compositius quam album tantum); sed unio naturae humanae ad Verbum, si sit relatio quaedam, non est res alia a natura humana unita; igitur nulla est realitas alia in natura humana non-unita et unita. Sed non dicuntur aliqua extrema uniri nisi aliquid sit realiter in uno extremo quod prius non fuit, ut prius probatum est⁴, – nec etiam in Verbo, quia non est ista unio naturae humanae ad Verbum.

those things which are really identical, it cannot be the case that the one is a real end term of something whereas the other is not (where there is only a rational difference, the one cannot be a real end term unless the other is as well, because a consideration of the rational aspect does not make it such in virtue of its being the end term of a real union). Now person and essence are really identical, and only have a rational difference (for otherwise ‘person’ would not be simple); therefore there cannot be a union of a human nature unless it is a union of the essence. The consequent, however, is false, therefore human nature cannot be united with the Word.

The seventh argument goes like this: a subject is the end term of the dependence of the nature united with it; the divine person, however – in so far as it is distinguished from other persons – is relative and is distinguished by something relative. Therefore, if human nature were to be united with the divine Word, the divine Word would formally be the end term of that dependence by that relation. Now this is false, since human nature is something non-relative, and thus only depends on something which is non-relative; therefore the end term of the dependence of something else ought to be more non-relative than what is dependent. Otherwise it would not be the end term of its dependence.

The eighth argument goes like this: every dependence is related to something which is naturally prior, and everything that is naturally prior is either a cause or earlier caused by that cause. Now the Word is not something which is caused earlier; if therefore there is a union of a nature with the Word, this will be by relation with the Word as a uniting efficient cause. Now a relation of creature with God as a uniting efficient cause is a relation with the whole Trinity, which effects and causes as a whole; therefore if human nature is united with the Word in his personhood, it is also united with the whole Trinity, – which is false.

The ninth goes like this: a relation does not differ from its foundation, because a relation does not establish a composition with its foundation (for being similar to white is not more composite than simply being white). Now the union of human nature with the Word, if it is a relation, is not different from human nature united; therefore in non-united human nature there is no other reality than in united human nature. Now we say that terms unite only if there is something real in one term which was not there before, as was shown before⁴, – and not in

- 15 Contra:
Ioan. 1: *Verbum caro factum est*, et ponitur pars principalior pro toto; ergo Verbum homo factum est.

[I. – Ad quaestionem]

- 16 Respondeo ad quaestionem quod ad inquirendum quomodo incarnatio sit possibilis, primo videndum est quid intelligitur per hoc quod dicitur quod ‘natura humana unitur personae Verbi’, et ulterius per hoc quod dicitur naturam uniri ‘personae naturae alterius’; et secundo, quomodo possibile sit naturam humanam uniri Verbo.

[A. – Quid intelligitur per personalem unionem]

- 17 De primo dico quod unio naturae humanae ad Verbum non dicit formaliter aliquod absolutum in extremo altero. Utrum autem concomitetur aliquod absolutum vel non, dicetur posterius⁵; formaliter tamen non dicit nisi respectum.

- 18 Respectus autem dividitur, quia quidam est eiusdem rationis in utroque extremo, sicut relationes quae fundantur super unitatem (ut ‘simile’ in uno extremo et in alio); quidam autem est respectus alterius rationis in uno extremo et in alio, sicut relationes suppositionis et superpositionis (ut paternitas et filiatio). Unio autem ‘in universali’ accepta est mutua in unitis extremis, — sed ‘in speciali’ est alterius rationis in utroque extremo, sicut alio modo unitur materia formae et alio modo forma materiae (prima enim unio est potentiae actui, sed secunda e contra), et sic de aliis. Naturam vero uniri personae alterius naturae non est unio eiusdem rationis, sed est e contra, quia nec natura et persona sunt eiusdem rationis; unde nec unio mutua est eiusdem rationis.

- 19 Loquamur igitur de unione naturae ad personam et suppositum. Ista est relatio posterioris ad prius, quia non habet natura subsistentiam nisi in quantum unitur personalitati; sed posterioritas

the Word either, because that union of human nature with the Word does not exist.

Against:

John 1: The Word became flesh, and the most important is taken for the whole; therefore the Word became human.

[I. – To the question]

I answer to the question that in order to investigate how incarnation is possible, we first have to see what is understood by ‘human nature is united with the person of the Word’, and next, by ‘a nature is united with the person of another nature’, and secondly, how it is possible that human nature is united with the Word.

[A. – What is understood by ‘personal union’]

Concerning the first point I say that the union of human nature with the Word does not formally express something non-relative in the other term. However, whether something non-relative is implied or not, will be explained later on.⁵ Formally, it only expresses a relation.

Relations, however, are subdivided: some have the same structure in regard to both terms, like relations which are founded on unity (as ‘the same’ in one term and in the other); other relations, however, have in one term a structure different from that in the other term, like relations of supposition and superposition (as fatherhood and sonship). Thus, union taken in a general meaning, has the same relation to both terms, but taken in a special meaning, it has a different structure in regard to either term, like matter is united with form in one way, but form with matter in another way (for the first is the union of potentiality with actuality, but the second is the opposite, and this also applies to other cases. Now the fact that a nature is united with a person of another nature, is not a symmetric union, but the contrary, since a nature and a person are not of the same kind; hence, their mutual union is not symmetric either.

Let us therefore talk about the union of nature to a person and a subject. That is a relation of posterior to prior, because human nature only has existence in so far as it is united with personhood. Now

ad prius naturaliter vel est effectus ad causam vel effectus causati posterioris ad causatum prius. Sed neutro modo refertur natura ad Verbum secundum unionem personalem, quia unio personalis facit illud cui unitur esse tale formaliter quale est illud quod unitur; sed nulla relatio causae ad effectum facit causam esse talem formaliter quale est causatum. — Similiter, manifestum est quod in proposito non est relatio secunda, quae est causati posterioris ad causatum prius.

20 Ideo non invenitur aliqua unio similis unioni naturae ad personam alterius naturae nisi unio accidentis ad subiectum.

21 Quod sine aliqua assertionem sic potest declarari: Substantia comparatur ad accidens non tantum in ratione causae efficientis et materialis, sed in ratione etiam alicuius alterius prioritatis, secundum quam accidens dependet ad substantiam, — et non in ratione alicuius generis causarum. Nam licet perfectionis sit in substantia quod sit causa efficiens accidentis, non tamen dicitur formaliter talis quale est accidens propter rationem causae efficientis, — sed substantia formaliter denominatur et dicitur esse talis quale est accidens, prout accidens unitur ei et terminat dependentiam illius unionis quae est accidentis ad subiectum. Quod etiam substantia sit causa materialis respectu accidentis, hoc est imperfectionis in substantia, quia secundum hoc substantia est in potentia et accidens actus eius; sed esse illud ad quod dependet aliud, non est imperfectionis. Et ideo est aliqua alia prioritas substantiae respectu accidentis, quae non includit ipsam perfici et informari, licet ipsum ‘terminare dependentiam accidentis’ concomitetur informatio. Unde sequitur quod substantia non terminat dependentiam accidentis nec in ratione causae efficientis nec in ratione causae materialis; et ideo aliqua alia prioritate terminat eius dependentiam, et hoc est in quantum substantia est actus quidam prior accidente. Unde substantiam esse priorem accidente et ipsam non dependere ad aliud, non est ipsam esse causam materialem et perfici accidente, licet concurrant. Similiter, ex hoc quod substantia est causa efficiens et materialis accidentis, ex hoc tamen non dicitur qualiter informatur accidente, et ideo est aliqua alia prioritas substantiae respectu accidentis a prioritate causae efficientis et materialis.

posteriority related to something naturally prior either is related as effect to cause or as the effect of what is caused later to what is caused earlier. However, in personal union human nature is not related to the Word in either of these ways, because personal union makes that with which it is united formally the same as that which is united. No relation of cause to effect makes the cause formally the same as what is caused. Similarly, it is obvious that in the present case it is not the second kind of relation, *i.e.* that of what is caused later to what is caused earlier.

We therefore only find a union similar to the union of a nature and the person of another nature if it is a union of an accident and a subject. 20

This can be explained as follows, without any ‘assertion’: 21

Substance is related to accident not only in virtue of being efficient and material cause, but also because of some other priority, according to which the accident depends on the substance, — and not in virtue of being some kind of cause. For although there is perfection in the substance which is the efficient cause of an accident, one does not say that it is formally such that it is an accident because of the efficient cause. Rather, substance is formally denominated and said to be such as the accident is, insofar as accident is united with it and is the end term of dependence of that union which is that of an accident related to a subject. That substance is also the material cause with respect to the accident, that is an imperfection in the substance, because in virtue of this feature substance is in potentiality, and the accident is its act. However, being that on which something else depends, is not an imperfection. And therefore there is another priority of substance over accident, which does not include being perfected and informed, although ‘being the end term of the dependence of accident’ implies informing. So it follows that the substance is not the end term of the dependence of the accident, neither as efficient cause nor as material cause; and therefore its dependency has its end term by some other priority, and this is insofar as substance is an act prior to the accident. Thus, that substance is prior to the accident and does not itself depend on something else, does not mean that it itself is the material cause and is perfected by the accident, although they concur. Similarly, to say that substance is the efficient and material cause of the accident, does not mean that it is said also how it is informed by the accident, and

22 Et sic est in proposito, quod persona est prior naturā et terminat dependentiam naturae assumptae, non prioritate causae efficientis vel materialis. Unde ‘naturam uniri personae alterius naturae’ est eam dependere ad illam personam, non quidem dependentiā causati ad causam, nec dependentiā causati posterioris ad causatum prius, sed dependentiā simili dependentiae accidentis ad subiectum (in quantum subsistat accidenti, sed non in quantum accidens informat ipsum subiectum). Nec scio alio nomine eam nominare.

[B. – Possibile est naturam humanam uniri Verbo]

23 Secundo, declarandum est quod possibile est naturam humanam uniri Verbo: et primo ex parte Verbi assumptis hoc est possibile, et secundo ex parte naturae assumptae.

[1. – De possibilitate ex parte Verbi assumptis]

24 Primo quidem ex parte Verbi assumptis hoc est possibile, quia non includit imperfectionem ex parte Verbi quod natura sibi uniatur in unitate personae, — quia si hoc sibi repugnaret, aut hoc esset in quantum persona divina aut in quantum est haec persona, sic quod non posset sibi uniri nisi alteri personae divinae uniretur. Sed neutro modo est repugnantia nec imperfectio in ipso Verbo. Non quidem primo modo, quia ex hoc quod Verbo unitur natura humana, non sequitur nisi quod persona terminat dependentiam alterius naturae ad ipsam, quae terminatio non est imperfectionis nec habet imperfectionem concomitantem (licet terminationem qua substantia terminat dependentiam accidentis concomitetur imperfectio, quia substantia perfectibilis est ab accidente sicut causa materialis). Nec secundo modo repugnat Verbo terminare dependentiam naturae humanae in quantum est tale suppositum, quia quaelibet entitas independens potest terminare dependentiam illius quod dependere potest ad ipsam; sed entitas qua Verbum distinguitur a Patre et Spiritu

therefore there is some other priority of substance over the accident than the priority of efficient and material cause.

And this is how it is in the present case: person is naturally prior and is the end term of the dependence of the assumed nature, not by a priority of efficient or material cause. Therefore, ‘a nature being united with a person of another nature’ means that it depends on that person, not by a dependence of that which is caused on a cause, nor by a dependence of that which is caused later on that which is caused earlier, but by a dependence similar to the dependence of an accident on a subject (insofar as it is the bearer of an accident, but not insofar as the accident informs the subject itself). And I don’t know how to name it by another name.

[B. – It is possible that human nature is united with the Word]

23 Secondly, we have to explain that it is possible that human nature is united with the Word. This is possible, firstly, considered from the assuming Word, and secondly, considered from the assumed nature.

[1. – The possibility considered from the assuming Word]

24 Now firstly, it is possible considered from the assuming Word, because it does not imply imperfection from the side of the Word that human nature is united with it in a personal union. Should this be inconsistent, that would be the case either insofar as it is a divine person, or insofar as it is this person (*i.e.* the Word), so that it were possible to be united with it only if human nature could be united with another divine person. Neither way, however, implies a contradiction or an imperfection in the Word itself.

Surely not in the first way, for from the fact that human nature is united with the Word, it only follows that ‘person’ is the end term of another nature’s dependence on it. Being an end term is nothing imperfect nor does it imply an imperfection (although being an end term by which a substance is the end term of the dependence of an accident does imply an imperfection, because a substance can be perfected by an accident, in the case of a material cause).

Nor, in the second way, is it incompatible with the Word to be the

Sancto est entitas independens, cum sit aliquid intrinsecum in divinis (sive dicat formaliter perfectionem sive non); ergo entitas Verbi potest terminare dependentiam illius naturae quae potest ei ut sic dependere; — sed natura humana potest sic dependere ad Verbum (ut probabitur articulo sequente⁶), et hoc secundum dependentiam talis rationis ad entitatem illius suppositi propriam sibi; igitur suppositum Verbi, in quantum tale, potest terminare dependentiam unionis naturae humanae ad ipsum.

25 *A l i i*⁷ tamen arguunt sic: ad hoc quod aliquid possit in effectum in quem potest alia causa, non requiritur nisi quod habeat virtutem causalitatis illius causae; sed personalitas creata potest terminare dependentiam naturae humanae. Nunc autem personalitas divina includit perfectius omnem personalitatem creatam; ergo potest terminare dependentiam naturae humanae.

26 Sed quod istud argumentum sit contra eos, probo. *D i c u n t*⁸ enim quod entitas personalis non est entitas nisi relativa, et per consequens non est entitas formaliter includens perfectionem (sicut et *i p s i*⁹ concedunt), licet non sit entitas includens imperfectionem; sed includens entitates et personalitates quascumque, includit perfectionem in se. Quomodo enim est possibile quod in se includat omnes personalitates et entitates, nisi in se includat perfectionem? Si igitur personalitas divina includat formaliter alias personalitates, oportet dicere consequenter quod includat perfectionem et quod de se dicat perfectionem; et similiter, si non includat perfectionem, non includit formaliter infinitas personalitates nec earum perfectiones.

27 Si dicas quod personalitas Verbi ut est in essentia sic dicas quod personalitas Patris est in essentia, quae tamen terminat dependentiam naturae; si etiam dicas quod Filius habet essentiam ut in se, et sic natura unitur essentiae ut in Verbo; — contra: ita Pater habet voluntatem ut in se et Pater vult voluntate ut in se, et Filius similiter, et tamen una voluntate volunt omnia (unde Pater creat voluntate ut in se, et Filius, et similiter Spiritus Sanctus, et tamen omnes una creatione et voluntate creant; unde Pater non creat voluntate ut in Filio, nec e

end term of the dependence of human nature insofar as it is such a subject, because any independent entity can be the end term of the dependence of that which can depend on it. The entity by which the Word is distinguished from the Father and the Holy Spirit is an independent entity, because it is something intrinsic in God (whether it is formally called a perfection or not). Therefore, the entity of the Word can be the end term of a dependence of that nature which can depend on it in such a way. Now human nature can depend on the Word in such a way (as will be proven in the next article⁶), and this in virtue of this kind of dependence on that subject's entity which is proper to it. Therefore, the subject of the Word, taken in this respect, can be the end term of the dependence of the union of human nature on itself.

Others⁷, however, argue in this way: the fact that something can effect what another cause can effect, only requires that it has the causal power of that cause. Now created personhood can be the end term of the dependence of human nature. However, divine personhood includes all created personhood in the most perfect way. Therefore, it can be the end term of the dependence of human nature.

I show, however, that that argument contradicts their position. For they say⁸ that personal entity is only a relational entity, and thus, it is not an entity formally including perfection (as they⁹ grant as well), although it is not an entity including imperfection either. Now that which includes entities and personhood of any kind, includes perfection in itself. For how is it possible that it includes all kinds of personhood and entities, if it does not in itself include perfection? If therefore divine personhood formally includes other kinds of personhood, then we must say per consequence that it includes perfection and that it has perfection from itself, and similarly, if it does not include perfection, it does not formally include infinite kinds of personhood nor their perfections.

If you say that it is the personhood of the Word as it is in the essence — in the way you say that the personhood of the Father is in the essence, which nevertheless is the endterm of the dependence of the human nature —, and if you say that the Son has the essence as it is in himself, and thus the nature is united with the essence as it is in the Word — against that argument: the Father has the divine will as it is in himself and the Father wills by the will as it is in himself, and similarly the Son, and yet they will everything by one will (hence the Father creates by the

contra). Igitur similiter, si Filius ‘essentiā ut in se’ terminaret dependentiam naturae, omnes personae una personalitate personarent et una non sine alia, si personarent per essentiam, licet Pater personaret per essentiam ut in se et Filius per eam ut in se. Non ergo ex perfectione personae ‘unde persona’ arguitur propositum, sed ex entitate non dependente, quae potest esse terminus dependentiae quae potest esse respectu talis entitatis. Unde patet quod non est repugnantia Verbum incarnari, nec in ista unione est repugnantia ex parte qua est persona, nec ex parte qua est ‘haec persona’, scilicet Verbum.

[2. – De possibilitate ex parte naturae assumptae]

28 Secundo ostenditur quod non sit repugnantia in illa unione naturae ad Verbum ex parte unitae naturae. Sed hoc ostendere est difficilius.

[a. – Opinio aliorum]

29 Quod autem aliqua natura sit personabilis personalitate alterius naturae, ostendunt a l i q u i ¹⁰ tripliciter.

P r i m o ¹¹ sic: natura est prior supposito, et etiam natura ut singularis est prior supposito, quia omne suppositum est natura singularis, non e contrario; sicut autem natura ad suppositum, sic suppositum ad personam; suppositum igitur est prius quam persona. Deus autem potest influere in primum, etsi non in secundum, – et in illud quod prius est, non influendo in illud quod posterius est; potest igitur influere in singularitatem personae non influendo in personalitatem ipsius, et sic natura singularis potest personari non propria personalitate, sed aliena.

30 S e c u n d o ¹¹ sic: « res unius generis potest habere modum alterius (sicut differentia substantialis dicitur esse ‘qualis’, unde habet modum

will as it is in himself, and the Son, and similarly the Holy Spirit, and still they all create with one creation and one will; therefore the Father does not create by the will as it is in the Son, nor conversely). Therefore similarly, if the Son were the endterm of the dependence of the nature ‘by the essence as it is in himself’, all persons would personify human nature by one personhood and one not without the other, if they were to personify by the essence, although the Father would personify by the essence as it is in him, and the Son by that essence as it is in him. So the case is not argued by the perfection of a person ‘which makes it a person’, but by an independent entity, which can be the term of dependence that can exist with respect to such entity. Therefore it is clear that there is no incompatibility between the Word and being incarnated, nor is there an incompatibility in that union from that by which it is a person, nor from that by which it is ‘this person’, sc. the Word.

[2. – The possibility considered from the assumed nature]

Secondly, it is shown that in this union of the nature with the Word there is no incompatibility considered from the nature united with it. This is rather difficult to show, however. 28

[a. – Opinion of others]

Some theologians¹⁰ show that a nature can be personified by the personhood of another nature, in three ways: 29

The first way runs like this¹¹: nature is prior to subject, and nature in its individuality is also prior to subject, because every subject is a individual nature, not the other way around. Now just as nature is related to subject, so subject is related to person. Therefore, subject is prior to person. God can have influence in the first but not the second – and in what is prior, not having influence in that which is posterior. Therefore, God can have influence in a person’s individuality, without having influence in its personhood and so the individual nature can be personified not by its own personhood, but by another.

The second way runs like this¹¹: “A thing of one genus can have the mode of another (like substantial difference is called ‘qualis’, therefore 30

qualitatis) », – igitur substantia potest habere modum accidentis; sed hoc est ‘naturam humanam uniri Verbo’, scilicet habere dependentiam ad Verbum, similem dependentiae accidentis ad substantiam praeter quod informet.

31 T e r t i o ¹¹ sic: quanto aliqua magis conveniunt secundum univocationem, tanto minus sunt unibilia, – et quanto magis recedunt ab univocatione, tanto magis accedunt ad unibilitatem, unde et supposita unius speciei minime sunt unibilia; sed genera generalissima (ut substantia et quantitas) unibilia sunt; Deus autem et creatura maxime distant, ergo sunt maxime unibilia.

[b. – Opinionis improbatio]

32 Sed istae rationes non concludunt:

Prima non, quia sequitur ‘hic lapis (loquendo de hypostasi sua), ergo lapis’, et non e contrario; igitur, secundum tuam rationem primam, posset Deus influere in singularitatem lapidis non influendo ad eius entitatem hypostaticam; igitur potest influere in lapidem aliquem in quantum ‘lapis’, etsi non in quantum ‘hic lapis’, et influere ad entitatem lapidis in quantum ‘lapis aliquis’, etsi non in quantum ‘hic lapis’; ergo extra intellectum potest manere lapis, loquendo de natura in isto lapide, et non esse singularis ut ‘hic lapis’, – quod est impossibile et est magis difficile quam propositum.¹² Unde oporteret ostendere quod alia res importetur per singularitatem et alia per personalitatem, ad hoc quod posset sic influere in uno non influendo in aliud, – et hoc patebit esse falsum¹³, quia non alia realitas in essentia importatur per unum et aliud. Quando autem in una essentia continentur plures realitates, non potest illa essentia esse ‘illud’ et non illud quod per identitatem inclusum est in ipso ex hoc quod ipsum est (ut si sensitiva sit eadem essentia habens in se per identitatem vegetativam, non potest esse sensitiva nisi maneat realitas importata per vegetativam). Unde oporteret ostendere quod ab alia re et ab alia sumitur singularitas et personalitas, ut sic possit esse unum sine alio; sed non est aliud realiter a quo accipitur singularitas et personalitas, ut patebit.¹³

has the mode of quality).” Therefore substance can have the mode of accident. Now this is the case with ‘human nature to be united with the Word’, that is, to have dependence on the Word, similar to the dependence of an accident on its substance apart from informing it.

The third way runs like this¹¹: the more univocal things are, the less they can be united, – and the less univocal things are, the more they can be united. Therefore, also subjects of one species can minimally be united; but the most general genera (like substance and quantity) can be united. God and creature are maximally distant, so they can be maximally united. 31

[b. – Refutation of this opinion]

Now these arguments are not conclusive: 32

Not the first, because ‘this stone (speaking about its subject), therefore a stone’ is valid, but not the other way around; Consequently, according to your first argument, it is possible that God flows into the individuality of a stone without flowing into its being a subject. Consequently, it is possible that God flows into a certain stone insofar it is ‘stone’ although not insofar it is ‘this stone’ and that he flows into the being of the stone insofar it is ‘some stone’ and not insofar it is ‘this stone’. Therefore, the particular stone can be left out of consideration, speaking about the nature in this stone and not being individual like ‘this stone’ – which is impossible and more difficult than the proposed solution.¹²

Hence, it ought to be shown that some entity is imported by individuality and another by personality in order for it to be possible that God flows in such way into the one without flowing into the other – and it will become clear that this is false¹³, because no other reality in the essence is imported by the one and the other. For when many realities are contained in one essence, it is not possible that this essence is ‘that’ and not that which is included by identity in itself from the fact that it is itself (like if something sensitive which has the same essence in itself by a vegetative identity, cannot be sensitive unless the reality imported by vegetative identity remains.)

Hence it ought to be shown that individuality is taken from one thing

33 Secunda etiam ratio non valet. Modus enim unius generis, sibi proprius, rei alterius generis competere non potest, quia ita est impossibilis modus unius generis rei alterius sicut res rei. Unde Philosophus¹⁴ in *V Metaphysicae* non ponit species qualitatis, sed modos 'qualis'; unde modi huius nominis 'qualis' conveniunt substantiae et accidenti, unde 'qualis' est modus differentiae cuiuslibet generis; sed modus accidenti proprius non convenit substantiae, et ideo falsum primo accipitur in illa ratione. Inhaerere enim est modus proprius et realis, consequens accidens unde accidens; ergo oporteret probare quod illud conveniret rei alterius generis.

34 Tertia similiter ratio non concludit. Angelus plus differt ab albedine quam corpus, quia est subiectum eius et causa, non autem angelus, et tamen angelus non est formaliter albus, sicut homo vel corpus – quod tamen sequeretur per rationem tuam. Unde genus subalternum substantiae, ut substantia corporea vel corporalis, magis convenit cum speciebus et genere subalterno alterius generis quam genera generalissima; unde substantia corporea unibilis est cum colore, non autem substantia incorporea. Et ideo tantum instatur in uno exemplo – in subiecto et accidente – quae sunt primo diversa; sed non est ex diversitate quod sunt unibilia, sed quia haec 'potentia' et hic 'actus' et hoc 'subiectum' illius. Sed non sic est in proposito: Verbum enim non est actus naturae ipsam informans. Et ideo non concludit illa ratio.

[c. – Opinio propria]

35 Dico quod oportet quod personalitas in natura humana sit talis et a tali, quod non includat contradictionem naturam esse sine illa, ita quod natura sub sua singularitate posset manere – sine propria personalitate – sub personalitate aliena.

36 Sed hoc potest poni duobus modis:

and personality from another, so that the one can be without the other. However, that from which individuality and personality are derived is in reality not another thing, as will become clear.¹³

The second argument does not prevail either. For the mode of one genus which is proper to it, cannot pertain to an entity of another genus, because the mode of one genus is exactly as incompatible with an entity of another genus as an entity is with an entity. Hence, the Philosopher¹⁴ does not offer a species of quality in his *Metaphysics* Book V, but 'qualitative modes'; so 'qualitative' is a distinguishing mode of any genus. Now, the mode proper to an accident does not pertain to the substance, and therefore is falsely accepted in the beginning in that argument. For to inhere in is a proper and real mode, following an accident and thus an accident itself; therefore it ought to be proven that it pertains to an entity of another genus.

Likewise, the third argument is not valid. An angel differs more from being white than a body does, for a body is its subject and condition, but an angel is not. Yet an angel is not formally white, as a human being or a body is. Just that would follow from your argument.

Therefore, a subalternate genus of substance, like a bodily or corporeal substance, is more in harmony with species and a subalternate genus of another genus than the most general genera. Therefore, a corporeal substance can be united with color, but an incorporeal substance cannot. So, it only occurs in one example – in a subject and an accident which are primarily diverse. However, that they can be united is not because they are diverse but because this 'potentiality' and this 'actuality' and this 'subject' of it. However, this is not the case in the issue at hand, for the Word is not the act of a nature which informs it. Therefore, that argument is not valid.

[c. – Scotus' own answer]

I say that it is necessary that personhood in human nature is such and with such a constitution, that it implies no contradiction for human nature to be without that personhood, so that human nature could keep its own individuality – without its own personhood – while going under the personhood of another person.

This can be expounded in two ways, however.

Uno modo sic, quia sicut natura aliā realitate positiva formaliter est natura et 'haec' (sicut supra dictum est¹⁵), sic aliā realitate positiva est haec natura singularis et hypostatica sive personata, ita quod sicut natura per entitatem singularitatis est indivisibilis in pluras naturas et repugnat sibi dividi in plura individua, ita per entitatem personalitatis est sibi repugnans personari alia personalitate (illa manente). Et tunc Deus potest influere in priorem non influendo in posteriorem.

- 37 Alio modo potest hoc poni, quod personalitas non addat super 'hanc naturam', nec rem, nec modum rei, sed tantum negationem dependentiae. Et tunc potest Deus illam naturam sibi unire amota negatione.
- 38 Sed utraque via habet aliqua contra se.
Nam ad primam viam consequuntur tria inconvenientia et absurda.
Primum, scilicet quod non omnis entitas positiva in creatura sit ex se dependens ad personam divinam ut sibi uniri possit, quia impossibile est illam entitatem manere quin maneat incommunicabilitas, cum per illam sit persona incommunicabilis, et per consequens esset impossibilis Verbo entitas incommunicabilitatis. Et sic impossibile esset totam realitatem meam manere in me et assumi personaliter a Verbo. Hoc autem videtur falsum: sicut enim natura humana tota dependet a tribus personis in entitate sua, ita tota dependet a Verbo quantum ad terminationem dependentiae eius ad personalitatem. Non igitur est aliqua entitas positiva qua natura haec sit incommunicabilis.
- 39 Praeterea, si personalitas dicat entitatem positivam, illa erit ultima eius entitas et perfectissima. Si igitur entitas qua persona est persona, non unitur Verbo, caret actualitate ultimata quando assumitur a Verbo. Quod autem natura non habeat suam ultimam perfectionem quando assumitur a Verbo, videtur inconveniens.
- 40 Praeterea, sequitur tertio quod Deus potest facere naturam humanam, et in nulla persona (nec creata, nec increata, nec in aliquo supposito) – probatio: quia si personalitas dicat entitatem positivam aliam quam singularitas, ergo potest natura humana produci a Deo in singularitate sine propria personalitate. Sed non tunc necessario sumitur a Verbo, quia aliter ex vi productionis assumeretur – quod

One way goes like this: just as it is by another positive reality that human nature formally is a nature and 'this' nature (as has been said above¹⁵), so it is by another positive reality that this nature is individual and hypostatic or personified; so that just as human nature cannot be divided into more natures in virtue of the entity of individuality and is incompatible with being divided into more individuals, so in virtue of the entity of personhood it is incompatible with being personified by another personhood (while the first personhood remains). And then God can flow into the former while not flowing into the latter.

The other way can be expounded like this: personhood does not add anything to 'this nature', neither something real, nor a mode of something real, but only the negation of dependence. Then, God can unite that nature with himself, if the negation is absent.

Now both ways have some points against them.

The first way implies three unacceptable and absurd points.

Here is the first one: not every positive entity in a creature is from itself dependent on a divine person so that it can be united with him, because it is impossible that that entity remains when its incommunicability does, since by that entity a person is incommunicable and, consequently, the entity of incommunicability would be impossible with the Word. It would be impossible in this way that my entire reality remains in me and is personally assumed by the Word. This seems to be false, however. Just as the entire human nature depends on the three persons in its existence, so it entirely depends on the Word as far as this is the end term of its dependence on personhood. Therefore, there is no positive entity by which this nature is incommunicable.

Moreover, if personhood expresses a positive entity, that will be its ultimate and most complete entity. So, if the entity by which a person is a person is not united with the Word, it lacks ultimate reality when it is assumed by the Word. However, that a nature does not have its ultimate perfection when it is assumed by the Word, seems unacceptable.

Moreover, in the third place, it follows that God can create human nature, yet in no person (neither in a created, nor in an uncreated person, nor in any subject). Proof: if personhood expresses a positive entity different from individuality, then human nature can be produced by God as having individuality without having its own personhood. However, then it is not necessarily assumed by the Word, since

falsum est.

41 Contra secundam viam:

Si 'natura haec' esset personata tantum per negationem actualis dependentiae, tunc anima separata esset persona, quia non habet actualem dependentiam, cum actu non perficiat corpus, licet habeat aptitudinalem dependentiam.

42 Praeterea, sicut dictum est II libro¹⁶, persona et individuum non constituuntur in esse per negationem, quia negatio non est de se 'haec', nec propria nisi per affirmationem; unde negatio non est de se incommunicabilis. Unde ergo est quod haec negatio dependentiae est propria et incommunicabilis, cum omnis negatio de se sit communis?

43 Praeterea, videtur quod non potest salvari ratio personae in natura creata, quia si in ista natura creata humana non sit nisi entitas singularitatis, et huic non repugnat communicabilitas – ut probatur. Igitur non est ibi persona cui repugnat communicari, sicut individuo dividi. Assumpta probatur ex dictis, quia dependere est imperfectionis, sicut dividi, sed numquam repugnat alicui imperfectio nisi propter quid intrinsecum positivum, sicut nec individuo dividi. Si igitur non sit aliquid positivum in personalitate, ei non repugnabit dependere.

44 Ideo dico tenendo viam mediam: nam dicere quod personalitas dicat entitatem positivam ultra singularitatem qua natura est incommunicabilis personae divinae, est nimis attribuere creaturae. Ponere etiam quod personalitas tantum dicat negationem dependentiae actualis, est nimis parum attribuere personalitati. Ideo, inter haec mediando, dico quod personalitas – ultra entitatem singularitatis in natura rationali qua natura est 'haec', importat negationem dependentiae actualis et aptitudinalis; nec tamen repugnat sibi quod dependeat ad personam naturae alterius, ut ad personam Verbi.

45 Quod declaratur sic :

Nam triplex est negatio: una scilicet, qua aliquid negatur ab alio quia affirmativum sibi repugnat (ut 'album non est nigrum'); alia est negatio qua aliquid negatur ab aliquo quia causa efficiens non causat

otherwise it would be assumed in virtue of the production power – which is false.

Against the second way:

If 'this nature' were only personified by the negation of actual dependence, then the soul separated from the body would be a person, since it has no actual dependence, because in reality no body makes it complete, although it has dispositional dependence.

Moreover, as has been said in book II¹⁶, person and individual are not constituted by a negation, since a negation is not 'this' by itself, nor is it proper unless by affirmation. Hence, a negation is not incommunicable by itself. Why, then, is it that this negation of dependence is proper and incommunicable, as every negation is general from itself?

Moreover, it seems that the notion of a person cannot be salvaged in a created nature: if there is only the entity of individuality in that created human nature, then it is not incompatible with communicability – as we prove. Therefore there is no person there for whom it is incompatible to be communicated, just as it is for an individual to be divided. The assumption is proved by what has been said: being dependent has some imperfection, just as being divided has, but an imperfection is only incompatible with something because of something intrinsically positive, just as being divided is incompatible with an individual. If, therefore, there is not something positive in personhood, then being dependent is not incompatible with it.

For this reason I say that a middle course is to be held, for by saying that personhood expresses a positive entity beyond individuality which by nature is incommunicable with a divine Person, one ascribes too much to a creature. By stating, however, that personhood only expresses the negation of actual dependence, one ascribes too little to personhood. Therefore, mediating between these two options, I say that personhood entails the negation of actual and dispositional dependence – beyond the entity of individuality in a rational nature by which a nature is 'this nature'. Still, it is not inconsistent for this nature to depend on the person of another nature, namely on the Person of the Word.

This is to be explained as follows:

There are three kinds of negations: one by which something is denied of something else, since the affirmation is inconsistent (for instance: 'something white is not black'); another negation is that by which

illud in eo (sicut ‘superficies non est alba’, quia causa efficiens non causat ibi albedinem). Et haec negatio duplex est, quia aut agens non agit ad quod passum natum est inclinari naturaliter, et tunc in illo passo est negatio alicuius quod aptum natum est esse in eo (ut si esset ignis et non haberet calorem quem natus est habere, quia agens hoc non causavit in eo); aut quia agens non agit, nec causat in eo passo illud ad quod passum non naturaliter inclinatur, sibi tamen non repugnat illud, et tunc in passo est negatio alicuius ad quod est in potentia neutra, quia nec naturaliter, nec violenter inclinatur ad illud (sicut forte naturalia se habent ad formas artificiales).

46 Ad propositum igitur dico quod negatio qua natura est incommunicabilis et qua non potest communicari nex personari personalitate alterius naturae, est propter formalem repugnantiam in illa natura. Et sic personae divinae sunt incommunicabiles, quia habent repugnantiam intrinsecam qua repugnat eis sic communicari vel personari (unde persona divina non potest personari aliqua alia personalitate); et haec negatio et repugnantia inest eis ratione alicuius positivi. Sed negatio ‘actualis dependentiae’ dictae non sufficit ad personalitatem creaturae, quia anima separata non est persona, quia licet actualiter non dependeat ad corpus, aptitudinaliter tamen inclinatur ad ipsum, ut sic dependeat ad personalitatem, et esset in corpore nisi esset impedimentum extrinsecum; sed negatio actualis dependentiae dictae et aptitudinalis, ut esset personalitas de se si non esset extrinsecum impedimentum, hoc facit personam. Unde natura in me est personata, quia ultra naturam singularitatis – nec dependet actualiter nec aptitudinaliter ad aliud dictā dependentiā; nec tamen ex hoc ponitur repugnantia si natura singularis in me personetur personalitate divina, quia cum hoc quod non habet dependentiam aptitudinalem ad aliam personalitatem, est in potentia obedienciali (quae est potentia neutra) ad personalitatem divinam; unde cum negatione dependentiae actualis et aptitudinalis stat potentia neutra et obediencialis ut personetur personalitate alia, licet ad eam non habeat aptitudinem naturalem.

something is denied of something because the efficient cause does not cause that in it (for instance: ‘a surface is not white’, because the efficient cause does not cause it to be white). This second kind of negation is twofold. Either an agent does not bring about that to which the object is inclined in a natural way, and then in that object there is a negation of something that is naturally apt to be in it (for instance, if there were a fire and it would not have the heat which it naturally has, because the agent has not caused it in it). Or the agent does not bring about, nor causes in that object that to which the object is not naturally inclined, although this would not be inconsistent. Then we have in an object a negation of something with respect to which it has a neutral potentiality, since it is not inclined to it in a natural, nor in an overpowering way (just as natural realities are certainly related to artificial forms).

With respect to the issue at hand I say, then, that a negation by which a nature is incommunicable and by which it cannot be made common, nor personified by the personhood of another nature, holds because of a formal incompatibility in that nature. In this way the divine persons are incommunicable, since they have an intrinsic incompatibility by which it is incompatible with them to be communicated or personified in this way (hence, a divine person cannot be personified by another personhood). This kind of negation and inconsistency is there in virtue of something positive. 46

However, the negation of the aforementioned ‘actual dependence’ is not a sufficient condition for the personhood of a creature, for a soul separated from the body is not a person: although it does not actually depend on a body, it is dispositionally inclined to it, to depend on personhood in this way, and it would be in a body, if there were no external impediment. However, the negation of the aforementioned actual dependence and of dispositional dependence so that there would be personhood by itself, if there were no external impediment – that makes a person. Hence, in me human nature is personified: beyond being an individual nature – it does not depend actually and dispositionally on something else by the aforementioned dependence. Yet from this no incompatibility follows if the individual nature in me is personified by divine personhood. The fact that it has no dispositional dependence on the personhood of another person, is in obediencial

- 47 Et ideo, licet natura singularis in Socrate posset personari personalitate divina, dum tamen est sub personalitate in Socrate, non est ibi violenter, quia non habet dependentiam naturalem, sed obedientialem respectu personalitatis divinae. Unde in tota entitate angeli et hominis est entitas positiva et negatio actualis dependentiae – non solum hoc, sed aptitudo ut non dependeat, quae aptitudo semper esset in actu nisi impediretur. Non est tamen repugnantia quin per potentiam obedientialem posset personari alia personalitate. Nec tamen est violentia quando est sub personalitate alia (ut divina), et non sub propria, quia obedit agenti respectu cuius est in potentia obedientiali. Et ideo quando Deus facit aliqua mirabilia, non facit contra naturam rei, sed facit secundum potentiam obedientialem in ipsa re.

[II. – Ad rationes principales

A. – Ad rationes communes]

- 48 Ad primum principale¹⁷, cum arguitur quod actus purus et infinitus non est componibilis, a l i q u i ¹⁸ faciunt vim in nomine ‘unionis’, dicentes quod unitur, sed non componitur; et verum est si compositio dicat unionem partis et partis. Non sic actus purus et infinitus est alicui componibilis, quia sic esse componibile est esse potentiale et pars habet perfectionem in toto quam non habet extra, quod non convenit infinito; unde actus purus et infinitus non est sic componibilis. Potest tamen dici ‘compositio’, sicut et ‘unio’; unde D a m a s c e n u s ¹⁹, libro III cap. 5 vel 6, concedit quod persona Christi est composita; ista enim compositio vel unio non est nisi dependentia naturae ad personam, prout prius descripta est dependentia.²⁰

potentiality (which is neutral potentiality) to divine personhood. Thus, neutral and obediential potentiality is compatible with the negation of actual and dispositional dependence so that it is personified by another personhood, although it does not have a natural disposition for it.

For this reason, although the individual nature in Socrates could be personified by divine personhood, while as yet it goes under the human personhood in Socrates, it is not there in an overpowering way, for it does not have a natural, but an obediential dependence with respect to divine personhood. Hence, in the whole existence of an angel or a human person there is a positive entity and the negation of actual dependence – not only this, but a disposition for not being dependent, a disposition which would always be realised if it were not impeded. Yet there is no incompatibility when it could be personified by the personhood of another by virtue of obediential potentiality. There is no overpowering either when it goes under another personhood (namely, divine), and not under its own personhood, since it obeys an agent with respect to whom it is in obediential potentiality. For this reason, when God does miraculous things, He does not do it against the nature of a thing, but does it according to the obediential potentiality in the thing itself.

[II. – To the initial arguments

A. – To the usual arguments]

As to the first initial argument¹⁷, when one argues that pure and infinite act cannot be composed, some thinkers¹⁸ stretch the noun ‘union’, saying that it is united, but not composed. This is true if composition means the union of one part with another. Pure and infinite act is not capable to be composed with anything in this way, since being composed in this way is to be potential and a part has its perfection in its whole which it does not have outside this whole. This is not coherent with being infinite. Therefore, pure and infinite act cannot be composed in this way. Yet, it can be called composition, and, likewise, union. Therefore, John of Damascus¹⁹ grants in book III chapter 5 or 6 that the person of Christ is composed, for this composition or union is only a kind of dependence of the nature on the person, according to the way dependence is described before.²⁰

49 Ad confirmationem rationis²¹ dicendum est quod Verbum non habet omnem entitatem formaliter (quia non est lapis formaliter), licet sit eminentius in eo; et eo modo quo non habetur natura humana a Verbo, potest sibi addi, scilicet secundum esse formale, – non secundum aliam entitatem, ut faciat perfectius, quia eminentius est in Verbo; et ideo sicut est in Verbo, non additur ei.

50 Ad secundum²² dicendum quod cum arguitur quod ‘unibilia sunt proportionabilia’, dico quod proportio proprie est in geometricis, prout aliquod aliquoties sumptum reddit totum. Sic autem non accipitur in proposito, sed accipitur proportio dependentiae; unde hic est proportio dependentis ad terminum dependentiae, – et sic potest esse proportio inter finitum et infinitum.

51 Ad tertium²³, cum arguitur quod contraria non possunt esse simul sic, ita ergo nec finitum et infinitum, quae sunt magis diversa, dicendum quod non sequitur. Nam album et linea sunt magis diversa quam album et nigrum, et tamen haec possunt simul esse, non autem illa. Unde illa dicuntur ‘diversa’ quae minus conveniunt, sed haec non sunt opposita aut repugnantia, nam opposita in pluribus conveniunt quam diversa; unde repugnantia non excludit quin in aliquo possint convenire; et ideo repugnantia est causa quare non sunt simul, non autem diversitas.

52 Ad quartum²⁴, cum dicitur quod incarnare est agere; igitur, incarnari est pati, d i c i t u r²⁵ quod non sequitur, quia intelligere est agere, et tamen intelligi non est pati. – Sed hic non respondet, quia intelligere non est actus transiens in aliud, nec intelligi, et ideo non patitur quod intelligitur. Incarnare autem est actus transiens in aliud, et ita – per consequens – patitur ad quod terminatur ille actus; unde oportet quod sibi correspondeat passio in passo. Ideo dico quod est figura dictionis in ratione, nam unire est causare unionem, quae est relatio realis in creatura. Incarnare igitur est agere uniendo naturam. Ideo actio est circa naturam, et natura illa patitur passione correspondente huic actioni; sed incarnari non significat illam

As to the confirmation of the argument²¹ we have to say that the Word does not have every kind of being formally, since He is not formally stone, although stone is in a more eminent way in Him. In the way in which the Word does not have the human nature, can it be added to Him, namely according to its formal being – not according to another entity in order to make it more perfect, since this entity is in the Word in a more eminent way. Therefore, in the way it is in the Word human nature is not added to Him.

To the second point²²: when one argues ‘what can be united, can be proportioned’, I say that proportion is properly a geometrical concept, namely: taking something several times renders a new whole. In this sense it is not used in the issue to be discussed, but it is taken as a relationship of dependence. Thus, here it is the relationship of what depends on the end term of dependence, and in this way there can be proportion between the finite and the infinite.

As to the third point²³, when one argues that contraries cannot be at the same moment in this way, nor in the same way, therefore, the finite and the infinite, which are more different, we have to say that this is not a valid argument. For a white thing and a line are more different than a white thing and a black thing and yet the former things can be at the same moment, but the latter cannot. Therefore, the latter things, which have less in common, are called ‘different’, yet these things are not opposites or incompatible, for opposites agree in more things than different things. Hence, incompatibility does not exclude that things can go together in some respect; and therefore incompatibility, and not difference, is a reason why they cannot be at the same moment.

As to the fourth point²⁴ claiming that to incarnate is to act, therefore being incarnated is being acted upon, it is said²⁵ that this is not valid, because to know is to act and yet being known is not being acted upon. However, this is not the answer, since knowing is not an act affecting something else, nor being known, and therefore, what is known is not being acted upon. However, to incarnate is an act affecting something else, and in this way the end term of that act is – by consequence – being acted upon. Hence, it is necessary that something passive corresponds with it in what is passive. Therefore I say that there is a figure of speech in the argument, for uniting is causing a union which is a real relation in the creature. So, to incarnate is to act by uniting a nature. Therefore,

passionem, sed unionem circa Verbum, quae non est passio; unde Verbum non est obiectum circa quod fiebat actio, et ideo non patitur.

[B. – Ad rationes speciales]

- 53 [Ad quintum] – Ad quintum²⁶ dicendum quod non alio positivo est natura haec existens actu et persona; non tamen eodem positivo quo ultimate est ‘natura haec’, est personata, sed cum negatione dependentiae actualis et aptitudinalis, et potest sine illa negatione.
- 54 Ad probationem²⁷, quando dicitur quod existentia per se in natura intellectuali sufficit ad personalitatem, dico quod est aequivocatio de ‘per se’. Nam ‘per se exsistere’ uno modo distinguitur contra inhaerere accidentaliter, et haec ‘per se existentia’ non facit personam; unde licet prius dictum sit quod existentia naturae in persona alterius naturae assimiletur existentiae accidentis²⁸, non tamen est ista talis qualis est illa. Alio modo dicitur ‘per se esse’ tertio modo perseitatis, scilicet ‘solitarie’, includendo negationem dependentiae actualis et aptitudinalis, – et sic convenit personae per se esse.
- 55 Ad secundam probationem²⁹, cum arguitur quod personalitas addit super naturam respectum ad causam efficientem, dicunt quod *quidam*³⁰ quod per se existentia dicit respectum non solum ad dictam causam efficientem et ad naturam divinam, sed ad voluntatem Dei, quae potest velle quod unum sit sine alio.
- Contra quod, fiat una realitas et una res quae contineat realitates! Non potest illa res manere nisi istae realitates maneant, – nec est mutatio a realitate ad realitatem, sed a re in rem.
- Ideo dico quod existentia actualis substantiae est ad se; nec tantum dicit respectum ad causam efficientem, sed dicit absolutum. Et ponatur quod dicat aliquid idem absolutum quod essentia; potest tamen esse licet personalitas non sit, quia non dicit illam negationem quae requiritur ad personalitatem, nec etiam ille respectus est ad causam efficientem qui importatur per personalitatem, sicut patet ex

it is action with regard to a nature and that nature is acted upon by something passive corresponding with that action; but to be incarnated does not signify that passive thing, but the union with respect to the Word and that is not something passive. Hence, the Word does not become the object of any action and, therefore, it is not acted upon.

[B. – To the special arguments]

- As to the fifth point²⁶ we have to say that it is not by another positive entity that this actually existing nature is also a person. Yet it is not personified by the same positive entity by which it ultimately is ‘this nature’, but by the negation of the actual and dispositional dependence; and it can exist without that negation. 53
- As to the proof²⁷ saying that in a rational nature existence by itself is sufficient for personhood, I say that there is an ambiguity in ‘by itself’. On the one hand, ‘to exist by itself’ is distinguished from to inhere accidentally and this ‘existence by itself’ does not constitute a person. Hence, although we have said before that the existence of a nature in a person of another nature is similar to the existence of an accident²⁸, yet the latter is not exactly like the former. On the other hand, ‘to be by itself’ is said to be in the third way of being-by-itself, namely, ‘on its own’, by including the negation of actual and dispositional dependence, and in this way being by itself is fitting to a person. 54
- As to the second proof²⁹, arguing that personhood adds a relation to the efficient cause on top of human nature, some say³⁰ that existence by itself expresses a relation not only to the aforementioned efficient cause and to the divine nature, but also to the divine will, which can will that the one is without the other. 55
- Against that: one real entity is made and one thing, which contains real features! This thing can only remain if these real features remain – there is no change from one real feature to another either, but from one thing into another.
- Therefore, I say that the existence of an actual substance is related to itself; it does not merely express a relation to the efficient cause, but expresses something non-relative. Now let us assume that it expresses something non-relative which is identical with the essence. Although there is no personhood, nevertheless it can exist, because it does not

praedictis³¹; unde potest natura esse sine illo respectu, et ideo non est idem respectus ille cum fundamento suo, iuxta illa quae dicta sunt in II.³²

56 Ad tertium probationem³³ dicendum quod natura quae est ‘haec’ de se, fit ‘haec’ per realitatem quae est eadem realiter cum illa natura; ideo non potest manere sine illa realitate quae est ‘haec’, quia illae realitates sunt una res. Sed persona non est personata personalitate positiva eadem cum realitate naturae et ‘huius naturae’, sed per negationem, quae potest auferri licet natura et singularitas maneat (sicut dictum est³⁴) et ideo non sicut natura ad singularitatem sic singularitas ad personalitatem; unde licet eodem realiter sit natura et ‘haec’, non tamen eodem realiter positivo est ‘natura haec’ et personata.

57 [Ad sextum] – Ad sextum principale³⁵: dictum est in I libro³⁶ quod essentia et persona non tantum differunt ratione, quia sine operatione intellectus est ibi communicabilitas et incommunicabilitas; et ideo illa ratio probabiliter ostendit hoc quod ibi dictum est. Sed qualiter dicerent tenentes oppositum, videant ipsi.

58 [Ad septimum] – Ad septimum³⁷, cum dicitur quod suppositum divinum – unde tale suppositum – non potest terminare dependentiam naturae, quia oportet sic terminans dependentiam esse quid absolutum, dicitur a q u i b u s d a m³⁸ quod non solum suppositum Verbi potest terminare istam dependentiam ut terminus formalis, sed etiam dependentiam ad ipsum ut ad causam efficientem illius unionis, ponentes quod Verbum habet specialem efficientiam in uniendo sibi naturam, quae non est communis tribus personis; unde respectu illius unionis habet causalitatem specialem efficientiae et etiam formalem.

59 Quod autem specialem efficientiam habeat, p r o b a n t³⁹, quia Verbum speciali illapsu illabitur naturae assumptae, sed pertinet ad genus causae efficientis. I t e m⁴⁰, Verbum assumit naturam; assumere autem est ‘ad se sumere’: hoc autem est agere – et ita habet actionem specialem in ista unione, quae aliis personis non est communis. Et ideo

express that negation, which is required for personhood, nor is it that relation to the efficient cause entailed by personhood, as is clear from the things said before.³¹ Hence, a nature can exist without that relation, and therefore that relation is not identical with its foundation, in accordance with what was said in II.³²

As to the third proof³³ we have to say that a nature which is ‘this’ from itself, becomes ‘this’ by a feature which is really identical with that nature; therefore it cannot remain without that feature which is ‘this’, because these features are one thing. Now a person is not personified by a positive personhood that is identical with a feature of her nature and of ‘this nature’, but by a negation, which can be taken away, although the nature and individuality remain (as has been said³⁴). Therefore, individuality is not related to personhood as nature is related to individuality. Hence, although it is by the same feature that a nature and ‘this’ are real, yet it is not by the same positive feature that ‘this nature’ and personified nature are real.

As to the sixth initial point³⁵ it has been said in Book I³⁶ that essence and person not only differ by a rational distinction, since communicability of nature and incommunicability of personhood obtain there without any activity of the intellect. And therefore, this sixth argument makes it plausible what has been said in that place. However, how they who hold the opposite would put it, is up to them.

As to the seventh point³⁷, when it is said that the divine subject – hence, such a subject – cannot be the end term of the dependence of the human nature, since in this case the end term of dependence has to be something non-relative, it is said by some³⁸ that the subject of the Word can be the end term not only of this dependence, as a formal end term, but also of a dependence on itself as the efficient cause of this union. They state that the Word, in uniting the human nature to itself, has some special effectivity, which is not common to the three Persons. Hence, with respect to this union the Word has some special efficient causality, and even a formal one.

They prove³⁹ that it has some special effectivity: the Word enters the assumed nature by a special entrance, but to enter belongs to the genus of efficient cause. Likewise⁴⁰, the Word assumes the nature, but to assume is ‘to take towards itself’, and this is to act – and thus it has some special activity in this union which is not common to the other

Filius dicitur « potentia operativa Patris ».

60 Secundo dicitur⁴¹ quod respectu istius unionis habet etiam rationem causae formalis, non quidem formae supervenientis, sed formae terminantis, quia suppositum respectu naturae est ut totum. Totum autem habet rationem formae, ut patet per Philosophum⁴² in II *Physicorum* et per Avicennam⁴³ in III *Metaphysicae* suae. Igitur, suppositum divinum habet rationem formae formaliter terminantis intervallum explicatum inter naturam et ipsum.

61 Sed utrumque istorum est falsum:
Primum quidem, scilicet quod Verbum habeat specialem efficientiam in ista unione, quia dicit Magister⁴⁴ hic distinctione 1 quod tota Trinitas operata est unionem et eodem modo, licet tantum Filius terminet istam unionem.

62 Si dicitur⁴⁵ quod licet tota Trinitas operata sit istam unionem, tamen alio modo Verbum quam Pater, et ideo potest tradere sibi efficientiam specialem, – contra: non video quod sit aliqua distinctio actionis trium personarum ad extra nisi in quantum consequitur principium originis illius, ut sic Pater dicatur ‘per Filium operari’ quia Filius non a se habet quod operetur sed a Patre, Pater autem a se habet. Sed secundum hoc non potest dici in proposito ‘quod Filius habet specialem actionem in ista unione’, quia si Pater fuisset incarnatus, et non Filius, alio modo secundum principium originis fuisset Pater operatus istam incarnationem quam Filius, quia Pater a se, et adhuc Filius operatus fuisset. Nulla igitur est efficientia in una persona respectu huius unionis quae non sit in alia. Unde dico quod si antecedens⁴⁶ esset, quod illud dictum non bene saperet, quod scilicet una persona habeat aliquam operationem ad extra per voluntatem quam non habeat alia persona.

63 Contra secundum⁴⁷, ‘quod Verbum est forma respectu naturae et unionis quam formaliter terminat’, quaero quare suppositum Verbi dicitur esse forma? Sic tu dicis: ‘quia totum’. Sed hoc non stat cum dicto suo, quia dicitur⁴⁸ quod suppositum supra naturam addat tantum negationem. Item, Verbum non est totum respectum naturae

Persons. For this reason the Son is called “the operational power of the Father”.

60 Second, they say⁴¹ that regarding this union, the subject of the Word also has the function of a formal cause, certainly not the function of a supervening form, but of a form which functions as an end term, since with respect to its nature a subject functions as a whole. The whole has the function of a form, as is evident from the Philosopher⁴² in II *Physics* and from Avicenna⁴³ in Book III of his *Metaphysics*. Therefore, the divine subject has the function of a form which is the end term of the ontological space between the nature and itself.

61 However, each of these two arguments is false: certainly the first one, namely the argument that the Word has some special effectivity in this union, for here, in distinction 1, the Master⁴⁴ says that the entire Trinity has worked this union and in the same way, although only the Son is the end term of this union.

62 If you say⁴⁵: although the entire Trinity has worked this union, yet the Word does so in an other way than the Father, and therefore He can give him special effectivity, then there is a counterargument: I do not see that there is a distinction in the external activity of the three Persons, unless as far as it follows the principle of that origin. In this way the Father is said ‘to work through the Son’, because the Son does not have from himself that He works, but from the Father, but the Father has it from himself. Along these lines, however, one cannot say in this case ‘that the Son has some special activity in this union’, since if the Father had been incarnated, and not the Son, according to the principle of origin the Father would have worked this incarnation in another way than the Son since the Father does so from himself; nevertheless the Son would still have worked as well. With respect to this union, therefore, there is no effectivity in one Person which is not in another Person. Hence, I say: if the antecedent were the case⁴⁶, that proposition would not be wise, namely that one Person has some external working by the will which another Person does not have.

63 Against the second argument⁴⁷ stating that ‘the Word is the form with respect to nature and union, of which it is formally the end term’, I ask: Why is the subject of the Word said to be the form? You say: ‘Because He is the whole.’ However, this is incompatible with what you have said, for you say⁴⁸ that the subject adds only a negation to the

assumptae, sed Verbum-homo est totum. Ergo, habes dicere quod Verbum-homo est forma respectu naturae. Item, si partes unionis comparentur ad invicem, natura magis haberet rationem formae quam persona ad quam dependet.

64 Ad illud igitur quod primo dicunt⁴⁹, quod ‘Verbum substantificat et illabatur’, dico quod omnis illapsus qui potest ibi esse, pertinens ad genus causae efficientis, est communis tribus personis, non nisi secundum ordinem originis differens (ut quia scilicet Pater illabatur a se, Filius autem non); sed illapsus – secundum quod natura est huius personae, non alterius – est formalis, et secundum praedicationem formalem Verbum est homo, quia natura assumpta est formaliter Filii, et non Patris.

65 Ad secundum⁵⁰ etiam quod dicunt, quod ‘Verbum est forma respectu naturae, quia totum’, dico quod totum est falsum: si enim ideo dicatur Verbum ‘forma’ quia terminat dependentiam naturae, tunc Pater esset forma Filii et causa formalis eius, quia Pater terminat habitudinem Filii ad Patrem.

66 Ad rationem ergo principalem⁵¹ dico: quando dicitur quod ‘nihil terminat dependentiam naturae nisi absolutum’, dico quod hoc verum est quando dependet ad aliud naturaliter prius, ut ad causam (vel ut causatum posterius ad causatum prius), quia causa dicitur esse causa secundum formam suam et naturam, et ideo terminat dependentiam ad ipsum secundum aliquid absolutum. Sic autem tota Trinitas in ratione causae terminat dependentiam creaturae ad ipsam, per voluntatem et essentiam, sed aliam dependentiam quae non est ad Verbum in ratione alicuius causae sed quae est ad ipsum ut suppositum, potest ut suppositum terminare (si autem suppositum constituitur per relationem vel per aliquid absolutum, videas⁵²).

67 [Ad octavum] – Ad octavum⁵³ patet per illud quod dictum est in positione⁵⁴, quod scilicet est dependentia alia a dependentia causati ad causam vel causati posterioris ad causatum prius. Ideo non sequitur.

68 [Ad nonum] – Ad nonum⁵⁵, cum arguitur quod ‘relatio non differt a

nature. Likewise, the Word is not the whole with respect to the assumed nature, but the Word-man is the whole. Therefore, you should say that the Word-man is the form with respect to the nature. Likewise, if the components of the union are compared to each other, the nature would have more the function of a form than the person it depends on.

Therefore, as to what they say first⁴⁹ that ‘the Word sustains and enters’, I say that all entering which can be there, belonging to the genus of efficient cause, is common to the three Persons, being different only according to the order of origin (because, for instance, the Father enters by himself, but the Son does not). The entering, however, according to which the human nature is the nature of this person and not of the other, is formal; and according to formal predication the Word is man, since the assumed nature is formally the nature of the Son, and not of the Father.

As to the second argument⁵⁰ which says that ‘the Word is a form with respect to the human nature, since He is the whole’, I say that this whole argument is false. If it is said for this reason that the Word is the form because He is the end term of the dependence of the nature, then the Father would be the form of the Son and his formal cause, since the Father is the end term of the relationship of the Son to the Father.

So to the initial argument⁵¹ I say: When one says that ‘only something non-relative is the end term of the dependence of a nature’, I say that this is true when it depends on something else which is structurally first, as on a cause (or as what is caused later on what is caused earlier), since a cause is called a cause according to its form and nature, and for that reason it is the end term of the dependence on itself as something non-relative. The entire Trinity is indeed causally the end term of the dependence of the creature on it – by his will and essence. However, as a subject it can be the end term of another dependence which is not related to the Word as the cause of something, but which is related to it as its subject. (Whether a subject, in turn, is constituted by a relation or by something non-relative, you will see below⁵²).

As to the eighth argument⁵³, it is clear by what we have stated as our position⁵⁴, namely, that this dependence differs from the dependence of what has been caused on its cause, or of what has been caused earlier on what has been caused later. Therefore, this argument is not valid.

As to the ninth argument⁵⁵, when one argues that ‘a relation does not

fundamento', dico quod sine mutatione Verbi natura humana est unita Verbo realiter, et prius fuit realiter non unita. Sed hoc non potest esse sine omni realitate nova, quia non sine omni mutatione. Ergo, aliqua realitas est in natura unita quae prius non fuit, et ideo illa relatio est alia realitas a natura unita. Unde ista ratio est pro me, quia probat quod relatio sit aliud a fundamento cuius contrarium est supra in II dictum.⁵⁶ Unde tota natura humana posset personari a Verbo.

[III. – Dubium]

69 Sed an ad istam personalitatem concomitetur aliqua alia natura in qua fundetur relatio, vel non, sed quod immediate posset esse mutatio ad illam relationem (quia in natura non est mutatio), hoc indiget inquisitione. Supponendo igitur, secundum dicta, quod natura unita Verbo dependeat non ad essentiam in Verbo ita quod essentia non sit terminus dependentiae, nec etiam essentia in supposito (quia sic in eadem ratione Pater terminaret, ut argutum est), sed entitas suppositi Verbi (ut suppositum) terminet illam dependentiam; ponendo etiam, secundum dicta, quod personalitas non dicat entitatem supra singularitatem, sed tantum negationem dependentiae supradictae cum qua stat potentia obedientialis naturae singularis ad aliam personalitatem; – hoc, inquam, supponendo, tunc dubium est an illa natura quae prius sic non dependebat ad personam et modo per actionem dependet, posset sine aliqua realitate nova, quae sit fundamentum illius dependentiae, dependere.

70 Quod non, videtur, quia non est mutatio ad relationem immediate: non enim est mutatio ad relationem nec novitas in ipsa nisi facta aliqua novitate aut mutatione in altero extremorum vel ambobus, ut patet per Philosophum⁵⁷ in *Physicorum*; sed non est aliqua mutatio in Verbo quando natura est sibi unita et est nova relatio unionis naturae ad Verbum. Ergo, est mutatio in natura. Ergo, oportet

differ from its foundation', I say that the human nature has really been united with the Word without a change of the Word itself and that it was really not united before. However, this is not possible without some new reality, since it does not occur without any change. Therefore, in the united nature there is something real which was not there before, and, therefore, that relation is a reality different from the united nature. Hence, that argument is in favor of my position, since it proves that a relation is something else than its foundation. The contrary of it has been said above in Book II.⁵⁶ Hence, the entire human nature can be personified by the Word.

[III. – A consideration]

It requires a closer examination, however, to see whether another nature on which the relation is founded does accompany that personhood, or whether it does not – but then a relational change could immediately occur (for there is no change in a nature). Let us assume then – according to what we have already said – that the nature which has been united with the Word, does not depend on the essence in the Word, so that the essence is not the end term of the dependence, not even as the essence in the subject (for then the Father would be an end term for the same reason, as we have argued), but that the entity of the subject of the Word (as subject) is the end term of that dependence. Let us also state – according to what we have already said – that personhood does not express an entity in addition to individuality, but only the negation of the aforementioned dependence, with which the obediential potentiality of an individual nature to another personhood is compatible. If, I say, we assume this, then there is a consideration whether that nature which did not in this way depend on the person before and now depends on it in virtue of an action, could depend on it without any new reality which is the foundation of that dependence.

It does not seem so, for there is no relational change immediately: there is only a relational change and something new in it if it is made by something new or some change in one of the terms or in both, as is clear from the Philosopher⁵⁷ in *Physics* V. However, there is no change in the Word when the human nature has been united with him and there is the new relation of the union with the Word. Therefore, there is a change in

dare aliquam entitatem positivam, quae sit proprium fundamentum illius relationis.

- 71 Si dicas quod (secundum ipsum⁵⁸) hoc non est necessarium in relatione unionis, quia Verbum potest dimittere illud fundamentum absolutum et potest esse non existente relatione unionis, – ex hoc sequitur propositum, quod scilicet immediate ad relationem potest esse mutatio, vel oportet ponere aliud fundamentum in infinitum.
- 72 Respondeo ergo quod non video quare oporteat ponere aliquod novum fundamentum et aliquam naturam sive entitatem novam, quae sit fundamentum illius relationis quae importatur per unionem, – nam posito fundamento et termino relationis, ponitur relatio quae consequitur illud fundamentum ex natura rei (sicut posito hoc albo et illo, sequitur relatio similitudinis huius ad illud). Igitur si ista relatio quae est naturae assumptae ad Verbum habeat novum fundamentum, non potest esse illud fundamentum sine relatione posito termino; sed terminus semper est; igitur Deus non potest facere illam entitatem in natura assumpta, nisi natura sit personata personalitate Verbi. Sed non est dare talem entitatem, ad quam necessario sequatur naturam personari personalitate Verbi et ad quam sequatur Verbum necessario personare naturam creatam.
- 73 Praeterea, si illa relatio requireret novum fundamentum, aut igitur illud est entitas substantialis aut accidentalis:
Primum non potest poni, quia aut est natura (ut materia vel forma), aut est realitas formalis quae continetur per identitatem in natura unita. Non primum, quia natura unita tunc esset compositior quam non unita, quia haberet plures materias vel plures formas quando est unita quam quando non. Si dicatur secundum, scilicet quod sit realitas contenta per identitatem in natura, – contra: natura quae continet aliquas realitates per identitatem, non potest esse sine illis (patet ex supradictis⁵⁹: si enim sensitiva continet vegetativam per identitatem, non posset esse sine illa respectu illius respectu cuius eam continet). Si igitur natura assumpta contineret per identitatem illud fundamentum, non posset esse sine realitate illius fundamenti; et per consequens non posset deponi natura assumpta, quia non maneret eadem numero sine

the nature. Therefore, it is necessary to suppose a positive entity which is the proper foundation of that relation.

If you say that (according to him⁵⁸) this is not necessary in the relation of the union, since the Word can leave aside that non-relative foundation and can exist while that relation of the union does not exist, then the point under consideration follows from this, namely that there can be a relational change immediately, or else it is necessary to assume an infinite series of foundations.

Therefore, I reply that I do not see why it is necessary to assume a new foundation and some nature or new entity which is the foundation of that relation induced by the union. Given the foundation and the end term of the relation, we have the relation which follows from that foundation by its very nature (just like, given this white thing and that white thing, the relation of similarity between this and that thing follows). Therefore, if this relation which connects the assumed nature with the Word, has a new foundation, that foundation cannot exist without that relation, given the end term. However, the end term is always there. Therefore, God can only make that entity in an assumed nature, if that nature has been personified by the personhood of the Word. However, no such entity can be supposed, an entity from which necessarily follows that the nature has been personified by the Word, and from which follows that the Word necessarily personifies a created nature.

Moreover, if that relation were to require a new foundation, then that foundation is either an essential entity or an accidental one.

The first possibility cannot hold, since it is either a nature (for instance, matter or form) or a formal reality which is contained by identity in the united nature. The first alternative does not hold, since in that case the united nature would be more composite than the non-united nature, since it would have more kinds of matter or more forms when it has been united than when it has not been. If the second alternative is brought forward, namely that it is reality, contained by identity in the nature, the following objection holds: a nature which contains realities by identity, cannot be without them (this is clear from what has been said above⁵⁹: if sense-gifted reality contains by identity vegetative reality, it cannot be without that vegetative reality in terms of identity with respect to that sense-gifted reality which contains the

Verbo cui unitur, – nec etiam natura prius non unita et postea unita esset eadem numero, quia realitas quae continetur per identitatem non esset eadem numero.

- 74 Nec potest dici quod fundamentum relationis illius unionis sit aliquod accidens, quia illa natura quae unitur et quae est fundamentum unionis est personabilis personalitate Verbi; sicut igitur non est persona aliquo accidente, sic nec est personabilis aliquo accidente.
- 75 Ideo dico: sicut ponitur in primo membro dicto ‘non est aliqua entitas cui repugnat manere sine unione ad Verbum’, ita nunc ponendum – in secundo – quod nulla est realitas quae necessario dependens sit ad Verbum dictā⁶⁰ dependentiā unionis, ita quod non esset illa entitas nisi uniretur et natura assumeretur, sed potest tota entitas assumi et non assumi.
- 76 Dico igitur quod ista propositio est falsa quae dicit quod relatio non potest de novo advenire nisi habeat fundamentum novum in alio extremo (uno vel in altero): falsa enim est in omnibus relationibus quae non consequuntur necessario extrema posita.
- 77 Quaedam enim est relatio, cuius fundamentum non potest esse sine termino et altero extremo relationis, et per consequens non potest sine illa relatione esse. Et illa relatio est eadem cum fundamento, sicut dictum est in II.⁶¹ Unde relatio quae necessario consequitur alterum extremum, eo quod non potest illud extremum esse sine altero, non est necessario accidentalis (sicut est de relatione creaturae ad Deum: nam creatura non potest esse sine Deo). Ideo posito extremo, necessario ponitur alterum extremum. Sed posito fundamento et terminis relationis, ponitur relatio. Ergo, creatura posita, necessario ponitur relatio eius ad Deum, et ideo non est alia res relatio illa a creatura.
- 78 Alia est relatio, respectu cuius ambo extrema sunt una causa, et consequitur illa sicut unam causam sufficientem (sicut est relatio similitudinis, quae consequitur duo, et est huius ad hoc, et e contra);

vegetative one). If, therefore, the assumed nature were to contain by identity that foundation, it could not be without the reality of that foundation. Consequently, the assumed nature could not be laid down, for it would not remain numerically identical without the Word with which it is united – nor would the nature which is not united earlier and is united later, be numerically identical, since the reality which is contained by identity, would not be numerically identical.

Nor is it possible to say that the foundation of the relation of that union is something accidental, for that nature which is united, and which is the foundation of the union, is personifiable by the personhood of the Word. Therefore, just as it is not a person by an accident, it is neither personifiable by an accident.

For this reason I say: just as we assert in the first member, namely: ‘every entity can remain without the union with the Word’, we have to assert now – in the second member – that there is no reality which is necessarily dependent on the Word by the aforesaid⁶⁰ dependence on the union, so that that entity would only be there if it were to be united and the nature were to be assumed, but the entire entity can be assumed and not-assumed.

Therefore, I say that this proposition is false, which says that a relation can only occur as a new one, if it has a new foundation in another term (in the one or the other term): it is false in all relations which do not necessarily follow from the terms which have been posed.

There is a certain kind of relation the foundation of which cannot exist without the end term and the other term of the relation, and, consequently, cannot exist without that relation. That relation is the same as its foundation, as has been said in II.⁶¹ Hence, a relation which necessarily follows from the other term by the fact that that term cannot exist without the other term, is not necessarily accidental (as is the case in the relation of the creation to God: the creation cannot exist without God). For this reason, given one term, we necessarily have the other term. Given the foundation and the end terms of a relation, we have the relation too. Therefore, given creation, we necessarily have its relation to God, and for that reason that relation is nothing else than creation.

Another kind of relation is that with respect to which both terms are one cause, and that relation follows from them as one sufficient cause (just as the relation of similarity does, which follows from both of them,

unde ista, licet non necessario consequatur alterum extremum sicut praedicta⁶² relatio, necessario tamen sequitur ambo extrema in se posita.

79 Tertia est relatio, quae nec necessario consequitur alterum extremum nec ambo: et illae sunt omnes relationes unionis. Non enim unitates sunt eiusdem rationis in unitis, sicut patet de unionibus respectu numeri. Nisi dicas quod eo ipso quod est unitas, est pars numeri – saltem patet de materia et forma et de subiecto et accidente. Si materia potest separari et postea uniri, nihil absolutum intrinsecum advenit materiae per hoc quod nunc unitur et prius non. Quando etiam anima separatur a corpore, manet idem corpus organicum, nec aliquid intrinsecum animae aufertur per hoc quod non unitur, nec sibi advenit quod sit fundamentum illius unionis. Similiter de subiecto et accidente: quando substantia panis transubstantiatur, manet quantitas sine proprio subiecto, nec aliquid deperit quantitati per hoc quod non unitur. Et si postea redeat subiectum suum et sibi uniatur, nihil absolutum novum quantitati advenit, sed tantum relatio; unde tantum deperit et acquiritur nova relatio.

80 In primo igitur modo relationis non potest mutatio ad relationem nisi ad fundamentum sit mutatio, quia illa relatio est eadem cum fundamento. In secundo modo relationis non potest de novo acquiri relatio nisi sit mutatio in altero extremo. Sed in tertio modo relationis potest immediate mutatio ad relationem, nec oportet aliquod absolutum innovari circa alterum extremorum.

81 Hoc autem patet de motu locali, qui non est ad aliquid absolutum: nam per motum localem non acquiritur locato locus, quia per motum semper acquiritur aliquid quod est in moto, locus autem est in locante; unde non est aliquid nisi ‘ubi’. ‘Ubi’ autem est formaliter respectus, non autem aliquid absolutum, quia « ‘ubi’ est circumscriptio corporis locabilis » etc. Unde per motum non acquiritur nisi habitudo ad locum circumscribentem locatum. – Nec enim ego possum intelligere quod ipsi mobili aliquid positivum absolutum acquiritur ex hoc quod nunc

and relates this and that, and conversely). Hence, although this relation does not follow necessarily from the one or the other term, as the aforesaid⁶² relation, yet it necessarily follows from both terms themselves, once given.

There is a third kind of relation which does not necessarily follow from one of the terms or from both: all relations of union are of this kind. In things united unities are not of the same nature, as is clear about unions with respect to number. Unless you say that by the fact that it is a unity, it is a part of a number – which is properly clear about matter and form and about subject and accident. If matter can be separated and united again later on, nothing which is intrinsically non-relative is added to matter by the fact that it is now united and not before. Even when a soul is separated from the body, it remains the same organic body, and nothing intrinsic to the soul is taken away by the fact that it is not united, and that which is the foundation of that union is not added either. With subject and accident it is similar: when the substance of bread is transubstantiated, the quantity remains without its own subject, nor is anything of the quantity lost by the fact that it is not united. If later on its subject returns and is united with it, nothing new which is non-relative is added to the quantity, but only the relation. Hence, only the relation is lost and a new relation is acquired.

In the first kind of relation, then, there can only be a change with respect to the relation if there is a change with respect to the foundation, because that relation is the same as the foundation. In the second kind of relation a relation can only acquire something new if the change is in the other term. But in the third kind of relation there can be a change with respect to the relation immediately, and it does not have to be innovated by something non-relative with regard to the other terms.

This becomes clear in the case of local movement, which does not pertain to something non-relative: for by local movement no place is acquired by the thing that is moved, because by movement always something which is moving is acquired, whereas a place is in something that occupies place; hence, it is only a ‘where’. However, ‘where’ is formally a relation, not something non-relative, because “‘where’ is the circumscriptio of a body that can be located” etc. Hence, by movement only a relation is acquired to a place which circumscribes something

est hic, nunc ibi. Qui autem potest intelligere intelligat, sed ego non possum aliud intelligere.

- 82 Ad Philosophum⁶³ igitur respondeo quod relatio, prout distinguitur ad aliis respectibus, dicitur esse 'intrinsicus adveniens' non quia consequitur subiectum ex parte materiae aut formae (illa enim relatio quae non est aliud a substantia rei, est respectu Dei), sed dicitur ideo esse 'intrinsicus adveniens', quia consequitur formas inhaerentes (ut quantitatem vel qualitatem); illae autem relationes non possunt advenire de novo sine novitate fundamenti in uno extremo vel in alio. Unde de huiusmodi relationibus verum est dictum Philosophi⁶⁴ quod in 'ad aliquid' non potest immediate esse motus, sed altero mutato consequitur nova relatio. Ad relationem tamen importatam per 'ubi' potest immediate esse motus, nec oportet aliquam novitatem esse in altero extremo. Et sic etiam est in transubstantiatione panis, quod tantum ibi habitudo unionis destruitur et deperditur; et quando unitur, habitudo tantum unionis acquiritur. Et sic natura humana, personata personalitate propria, est in potentia obedienciali ut uniatur; et nulla realitas absoluta sibi advenit per hoc quod unitur.

[IV. – Ad rationes contra secundam viam [in opinione propria enuntiatam]

- 83 Ad rationes positas contra secundam viam⁶⁵, per quae ostendebatur quod personalitas non tantum dicit negationem actualis dependentiae, quatenus sunt contra dicta, respondendum est. Et ad primam⁶⁶, de anima, patet quod non est contra dicta, quia 'anima separata licet non habeat actualem dependentiam ad corpus, habet tamen aptitudinalem'; persona autem ultima singularitate in natura rationali non tantum dicit negationem actualis dependentiae, sed etiam aptitudinalis. Et intelligo quod illa aptitudo sit talis quod natura singularis, quantum est ex se, si non impeditur, habet dependentiam ad personam illius naturae.

that is moved. – For I cannot understand either what positive non-relative entity something mobile can acquire from the fact that it is now here, now there. However, who is able to understand, let him understand; but I cannot understand it otherwise.

To the Philosopher⁶³ I therefore reply that a relation, insofar as it is distinguished from other relations, is said to be 'something intrinsically additional', not because it follows from the subject on the part of matter or form (for that relation which is not different from a thing's substance, is the relation to God), but it is said to be 'something intrinsically additional' because it follows from inherent forms (like quantity or quality); those relations, however, cannot be added as new without something new in the foundation in the one or the other term. Hence, about relations of that kind the saying of the Philosopher⁶⁴ is true: in 'relation' there cannot immediately be a movement, but once the term has changed, a new relation follows. Nevertheless, with respect to a relation indicated by 'where', there can immediately be a change, and there does not need to be something new in the other term. And this is also how it is in the bread by transubstantiation: here only the relation of union is destroyed and lost; and when united, only the relation of union is acquired. In this way, human nature personified by its proper personhood has an obediencial potentiality for being united; and no non-relative reality is added by the fact that it is united.

[IV. – To the arguments against the second way mentioned in Scotus' own answer]

We have to reply to the arguments put forward against the second theory⁶⁵ by which it was shown that personhood not only expresses the negation of actual dependence, as far as they run counter what has been said. As to the first argument⁶⁶ – the argument about the soul –, it is clear that it is not against what has been said: 'Although a separated soul does not have an actual dependence on the body, it does have a dispositional one.' By its ultimate individuality in a rational nature, 'person' not only expresses the negation of actual, but also of dispositional dependence. I understand this as follows: that disposition is such that, if it is not impeded, an individual nature, as far as it is from itself, depends on a person of that nature.

- 84 Ad aliam⁶⁷, quando dicitur quod ‘negatio non est incommunicabilis’, dico quod dupliciter potest intelligi aliquid esse incommunicabile: uno modo, quod aliquid sit incommunicabile pluribus quorum quodlibet est ‘ipsum’; – alio modo, quod sit incommunicabile quo, sicut per modum formae.
- 85 Incommunicabilitas autem primo modo convenit singulari, et hoc per entitatem positivam per quam est singularis. Sed hoc non convenit singularitati ut singularitas est absolute (quia essentia divina singularis est, quae tamen comunicabilis est pluribus), sed hoc convenit singularitati in quantum limitata est. Unde inconveniens est quod illa singularitas sit aliquo negativo, quia repugnat singularitati comunicabilitas, – repugnantia non est nisi propter aliquid positivum.
- 86 Sed de illa incommunicabilitate quae est per modum formae et naturae, dico quod nulli naturae singulari personari repugnat (seu comunicabilitas) quando possit personari alia personalitate, quia licet persona creata habeat negationem actualis et aptitudinalis dependentiae, non tamen sibi repugnat dependere ad aliam personalitatem, quia si sibi repugnaret nullo modo posset sibi comunicari ut ab alia persona posset assumi. Unde persona cui repugnat alia personalitate personari habet aliquid positivum quo sibi repugnat, sicut persona divina; sed persona creata, non obstante quod personetur hac personalitate suae naturae, non repugnat sibi, sed est in potentia obedientiali ut personetur alia personalitate. Et ideo, in creaturis, ad hoc ut natura singularis personetur, sufficiunt negationes actualis dependentiae et aptitudinalis: non enim haec natura singularis in Socrate habet actualem dependentiam ad aliam personam, quia agens hoc non egit – unde illa negatio est propter defectum agentis. Similiter, non aptitudinalem ad aliam personalitatem, quia non est in potentia naturali, sed solum obedientiali ad hoc.
- 87 Sed dices quod tunc sequitur quod persona non sit eiusdem rationis in natura increata et creata, si ibi repugnet personae personari alia personalitate et in creaturis non repugnet.

Concerning the second argument⁶⁷ which says that ‘a negation is not incommunicable’, I say that ‘something is incommunicable’ can be understood in two ways: in one way, that something cannot be common to more things any one of which is ‘itself’; in the other way, that it is incommunicable by something, for instance, by the mode of a form.

The first kind of incommunicability fits an individual, and it does so by the positive entity by which it is individual. However, it does not fit individuality as far as individuality is meant in a non-relative sense (for the divine nature is individual, which can yet be common to more persons), but it does fit individuality as far as it is limited. Hence, it is absurd that this kind of individuality is there by something negative, since comunicability is incompatible with individuality – there is only incompatibility because of something positive.

However, about the kind of incommunicability which is by the mode of a form and nature, I say that being personified is compatible with any individual nature (or comunicability) when it can be personified by another personhood. For although a created person is characterized by the negation of actual and dispositional dependence, it is yet not inconsistent for an individual nature to be dependent on another personhood, for if it were inconsistent, it could in no way be communicated so that it could be assumed by another personhood. Hence, a person for whom it is inconsistent to be personified by another personhood, has something positive that accounts for the inconsistency, as is the case with a divine person. It is not inconsistent for a created person, however: while nothing obviates it to be personified by a personhood of its own nature, it still enjoys the obediential potentiality to be personified by another personhood. And therefore, in creatures the negations of actual and dispositional dependence are sufficient for an individual nature to be personified: for this individual nature in Socrates does not have an actual dependence on another person, because the agent does not need this – hence, that negation is there because of a defect of the agent. Nor does it have, similarly, a dispositional dependence on another personhood, for it does not have a natural, but only an obediential potentiality to that.

However, you will say that it follows then, that person is not of the same kind in uncreated and created nature if there it is inconsistent for a person to be personified by another personhood and not inconsistent

- 88 Item, quomodo est possibile quod negatio sit propria, nec secundum eam sit propria personalitas, cum omnis negatio de se sit communis et communicabilis?
- 89 Ad primum⁶⁸ respondeo quod persona quantum ad negationem aptitudinem hic et ibi [est eiusdem rationis]⁶⁹, sed non quantum ad negationem possibilitatis, quia hic est possibile, ibi autem non.
- 90 Ad aliud⁷⁰, quando quaeritur quomodo est personalitas propria cum negatio non sit propria, dico quod singularitas est propria, – et quidquid entitatis et proprietatis est in persona positive, est a singularitate in natura rationali; unde per illam singularitatem concluditur illa duplex negatio. Quare autem singularitas requirit aliquid positivum, et non personalitas, patet ex iam dictis.⁷¹
- 91 Ad tertium⁷², cum arguitur quod non esset persona in creaturis quia quidquid entitatis est ibi potest communicari, patet quod non dicitur ‘persona’ in creaturis quia sibi repugnat communicabilitas (hoc enim solum convenit personae divinae; et ideo ibi est persona tantum complete, quantum ad omnem rationem personae); sed est persona creata propter duplicem negationem dependentiae, cum qua tamen stat potentia obedientialis ad aliam personalitatem, sicut patet ex dictis.⁷³

with creatures.

Likewise, how is it possible that the negation is proper and that it is not proper personhood in virtue of that negation, when every negation is as such common and communicable? 88

I answer at the first point⁶⁸ that, as far as a negation of dispositions is concerned, the person is here (with creatures) and there (with God) of the same kind, but not as far as the negation of the possibility is concerned, since it is possible here but not there. 89

As to the other point⁷⁰, when it is asked how personhood is proper while a negation is not proper, I say that individuality is proper. And whatever entity and propriety are in a positive way in a person, are there in virtue of the individuality in a rational nature. Hence, that twofold negation is concluded on the basis of that individuality. It is clear from what has already been said⁷¹ why individuality, and not personhood, requires something positive. 90

As to the third point⁷², when it is argued that there would not be a person in creatures, since whatever has existence there can be made common – it is clear that ‘person’ is not used with respect to creatures, since communicability is inconsistent with it (for this only pertains to a divine person; and, therefore, there is a person in a complete sense only insofar as every characteristic of a person is present). However, a created person is a person because of a twofold negation of dependence, with which the obediential potentiality to another personhood is still compatible, as is clear from what has been said.⁷³ 91

Endnotes

- ¹ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV c. 3 (1005b19-30).
- ² See Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II d. 1 § 239 (XVIII 80).
- ³ Scotus started his list of ‘special’ arguments in § 7, of which the first was counted fifth in the main, consecutive order. He now resumes this main order.
- ⁴ See above, § 3.
- ⁵ See below, §§ 69-82.
- ⁶ See below, §§ 46-47.
- ⁷ The critical edition refers to William of Ware, *Sent.* III q.1.
- ⁸ The critical edition refers to William of Ware, *Sent.* I q.76 [d. 25 q. un] ; q.79 [d. 26 q. 3] ; q.80 [d. 26 q. 4].
- ⁹ *Ibidem*, q. 74 [d. 20 q. un.] ad 2.
- ¹⁰ The critical edition refers to various quotations of William of Ware, *Sent.* III q. 1 [d. 1 q. 1] for the three arguments below in §§ 29-31.
- ¹¹ See note 10.
- ¹² Sc. the solution proposed in § 29.
- ¹³ See below, § 72.
- ¹⁴ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V c. 14 (1020a33-b13).
- ¹⁵ See § 32.
- ¹⁶ Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II d.3 §§ 45-53 (XVIII 242-244).
- ¹⁷ See above, § 2.
- ¹⁸ The critical edition refers to Richard of Middleton, *Sent.* III d. 3 princ. 1 q. 1 ad 4.
- ¹⁹ Johannes Damascenus, *De fide orthodoxa*, c. 49 [III c. 5] (FIP t.s. VIII 184, PG 94, 999).
- ²⁰ See above, § 46.
- ²¹ See above, § 3.
- ²² See above, § 4.
- ²³ See above, § 5.
- ²⁴ See above, § 6.
- ²⁵ The critical edition refers to Richard of Middleton, *Sent.* III d. 1 princ. 1 q. 1 arg. 5; St. Bonaventure, *Sent.* III d. 1 a. 1 q. 1 ad 1; Thomas Aquinas, *Sent.* III d. 1 q. 1 a. 1 ad 1.
- ²⁶ See above, § 7.
- ²⁷ See above, § 8.

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- ²⁸ See above, § 22.
- ²⁹ See above, § 9.
- ³⁰ The critical edition refers to William of Ware, *Sent.* III q. 4 [d. 1 q. 4].
- ³¹ See above, §§ 17-19.
- ³² See Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II d. 1 § 239 (XVIII 80).
- ³³ See above, § 10.
- ³⁴ See above, §§ 46-47.
- ³⁵ See above, § 11.
- ³⁶ Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I d.2 §§ 248, 259 (XVI 207-208, 211).
- ³⁷ See above, § 12.
- ³⁸ The critical edition refers to William of Ware, *Sent.* III q. 4 [d. 1 q. 4] and q. 1 [d. 1 q. 1].
- ³⁹ The critical edition refers to William of Ware, *Sent.* III q. 15 [d. 5 q. 2]; q. 1 [d. 1 q. 1].
- ⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, q. 14 [d. 5 q. 1]; q. 4 [d. 1 q. 4].
- ⁴¹ *Ibidem*, q. 14 [d. 5 q. 1]; q. 10 [d. 2 q. 4].
- ⁴² Aristotle, *Physics* II t. 31 (195a18).
- ⁴³ Avicenna, *Metaphysica* III c. 2 (I 110).
- ⁴⁴ Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae* III d. 1 c. 3 n. 2 (SB V 26-27).
- ⁴⁵ The critical edition refers to William of Ware, *Sent.* III q. 4 [d. 1 q. 4].
- ⁴⁶ See above, § 58.
- ⁴⁷ See above, § 60.
- ⁴⁸ The critical edition refers to William of Ware, *Sent.* III q. 17 [d. 5 q. 4] in corp. et ad 1.
- ⁴⁹ See above, §§ 58-59.
- ⁵⁰ See above, § 60.
- ⁵¹ See above, § 58 and § 12.
- ⁵² Scotus refers to *Lectura* III d. 5; see also *Lectura* I d. 26 § 1 (XVII 317).
- ⁵³ See above, § 13.
- ⁵⁴ See above, § 22.
- ⁵⁵ See above, § 14.
- ⁵⁶ See above, § 9.
- ⁵⁷ Aristotle, *Physics* V t. 10 (225b11-13).
- ⁵⁸ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V c. 15 (1021a29-30).
- ⁵⁹ See above, § 32.
- ⁶⁰ See above, § 69.
- ⁶¹ Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II d. 1 § 238 (XVIII 80).

⁶² See above, § 77.

⁶³ See above, § 70.

⁶⁴ Aristotle as referred to in § 70. See also note 57.

⁶⁵ See above, §§ 41-43.

⁶⁶ See above, § 41.

⁶⁷ See above, § 42.

⁶⁸ See above, § 87.

⁶⁹ Added by the editors of the critical edition, in line with § 87.

⁷⁰ See above, § 88.

⁷¹ See above, §§ 85-86.

⁷² See above, § 43.

⁷³ See above, § 86.